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3Several initiatives aimed at reducing trade
barriers for Least Developed Countries have
been proposed recently. These include the EU
decision to provide duty-free and quota-free
access on an autonomous basis for all products
except arms when imported from the Least
Developed Countries, and a proposal from the
WTO General Director to bind all tarif fs on
imports from Least Developed Countries at zero
rates in the World Trade Organisation. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the
economic impacts for the Least Developed
Countries of duty-free and quota-free access in
their export markets. The main focus is on the
QUAD markets (Canada, the EU, Japan, and the
USA). The report documents the significance of
existing trade barriers and evaluates the
economic consequences of removing these
barriers. The impact of supply capacity
constraints in Least Developed Countries on
their ability to utilise preferential trade
arrangements is also investigated. Moreover,
the report evaluates the significance for Least
Developed Countries of certain crucial aspects
of preferential trading arrangements, such as
the extent of product coverage, the question of
binding tarif fs and procedures, the use of
safeguard measures in importing countries,
graduation procedures and rules of origin.
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9• The Least Developed Countries are the
poorest countries in the world. They are
officially designated as “least developed” by
the General Assembly of the United Nations
on the basis of a number of agreed criteria. 
• 48 countries are currently classified as
Least Developed. Most of them are located
in Africa. Their combined population is
613.5 million, and their average income per
capita is less than a dollar a day. The
average growth in real GDP per capita was
0.9% in 1990–98, which was much lower
than the average growth rate for all
developing countries (3.1%).
• The Least Developed Countries’ share of
world exports has declined from 0.8% in
1980 to less than 0.5% today.
• With the aim of preventing further
marginalisation of the Least Developed
Countries, a plan of action, calling for
improved market access for their export
products, was agreed to at the WTO
Ministerial Conference in Singapore in
1996.
• Most export products from the Least
Developed Countries already face zero
tarif fs in the main export markets (EU,
USA, Japan, and Canada), but major
restrictions remain for textiles and clothing
and in the agricultural sector. In other
developing countries, the import barriers
are often more restrictive than in the
industrialised countries.
• Some exports from Least Developed
Countries face reduced tarif fs under
preferential trade arrangements. These
trade preferences are generally provided by
the importing country on an autonomous
basis and therefore offer less security for
the exporting countries than do tariffs that
are bound in the WTO. 
• Several proposals have recently been put
forth in order to enhance the number of
products from the Least Developed
Countries that are granted duty-free and
quota-free access, and in order to reduce
the uncertainty related to existing trade
preferences. The EU recently decided to
grant free market access for all products
except arms within 2009. Two other OECD
countries, Norway and New Zealand, have
recently also decided to grant duty-free and
quota-free access to all LDCs. (Norway
from 1st July 2002.) WTO General Director
and the Least Developed Countries
themselves have proposed to bind all tariffs
on their products at zero rates in the WTO.
• The aim of this study is to evaluate the
economic impacts on the Least Developed
Countries from such policy reforms. The
title of the study is: “Economic impacts on
the Least Developed Countries of the





Improved market access in industrialised
countries is often seen as an important
contribution to economic growth and increased
welfare in developing countries. More recently,
it has also come to be regarded as a
precondition for a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations. 
This report describes the present import
barriers faced by Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) in the European Union, the USA, Japan
and Canada (i.e. the QUAD) and analyses which
benefits the LDCs could possibly realise from
duty-free and quota-free access in these
markets. It also discusses how preferential trade
arrangements for the LDCs should be designed
to serve the interests of LDCs.
Background
When this study was initiated, three proposals
on duty-free access for LDCs had been
launched:
1. Binding in the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) of duty-free and quota-free access
for imports from LDCs.
2. Duty-free and quota-free access for
“essentially all products” from LDCs.
3. Duty-free and quota-free access for
“everything but arms” when imported from
LDCs. 
The first proposal was presented by both the
General Director of the WTO and by the LDCs
themselves. The last two proposals were made
by the EU, the first before the Ministerial
Conference in Seattle in 1999 and the last in
September 2000. In February this year, the EU
decided to provide duty-free and quota-free
access for LDCs for “everything but arms”
within 2009. 
The first purpose of this study is to investigate,
with reference to these three proposals,
potential benefits from duty-free and quota-free
access to major export markets for LDCs. The
second purpose is to analyse how preferential
trade arrangements for the LDCs should be
designed in order to serve the interests of the
LDCs. In principle, there are two main
differences between the proposals:
• The extent of product coverage
• The degree of binding of preferences
The key questions are therefore: How important
is it for the LDCs to have duty-free access
extended to all products, compared to a
situation where the importing countries have
the opportunity to restrict the imports of a few,
sensitive products? And how important is the
reduction in uncertainty that would be provided
by binding import tarif fs at zero rates in the
WTO, compared to a situation where duty-free
access is granted on a unilateral and non-
contractual basis? 
Other important questions with respect to the
design of preferential trade arrangements
concern: 
• Safeguards (to which extent should the
importing countries have the opportunity to
suspend trade preferences if there is a
surge in imports from LDCs?), 
• Graduation (what should happen to trade
preferences when a country graduates from
the list of LDCs?), and 
• Rules of origin (which rules of origin are
needed in order for the LDCs to be able to
take advantage of the trade preferences?).   
Executive Summary
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Major findings and conclusions
The aggregate benefits of duty-free and quota-free
access for the LDCs are likely to be modest, even
when measured relative to their present low
levels of income. The main reasons are (1) that
most LDCs presently enjoy quite liberal market
access in important export markets, and (2) that
the ability of LDCs to take advantage of trade
preferences is limited, due to constraints on
supply capacity. 
Nevertheless, some LDCs will reap significant
benefits in a few product categories. The most
important one is clothing, but producers of
agricultural products such as sugar and tobacco,
will benefit as well. There are also potential
benefits related to the exports of rice and meat
from LDCs, but these benefits will be more
difficult to realise. 
With respect to the design of preferential trade
arrangements for the LDCs, we believe that the
most important issue for the LDCs as a group is
to have the product coverage of provisions for
free market access extended to all products.
Since the benefits of duty-free access are
concentrated in a few product categories, which
typically are quite sensitive import products in
the QUAD, the importing countries may
significantly reduce the benefits for LDCs of
free market access by retaining their import
controls in only a few product categories. 
The benefits for the LDCs of free market access
would be further enhanced if the importing
countries were to make their preferential trade
arrangements more binding. At present, trade
preferences for LDCs may be withdrawn at any
time, because they are provided on a unilateral
and autonomous basis. The simplest way of
making preferences more binding would be for
the importing countries to notify the WTO that
their preferential trade arrangements should be
considered as binding within the WTO
framework. A number of other approaches are
available as well, including plurilateral and
multilateral solutions. Note, however, that it is
impossible to eliminate the uncertainty about
preferential margins as long as regular, non-
preferential tariffs are subject to negotiations.
The benefits of binding tariffs faced by LDCs at
zero rates should therefore not be overstated. 
The possibility of using safeguard measures may
play an important role in the liberalisation of
trade. Making trade preferences for LDCs more
binding will undoubtedly call for a revision of
the safeguard provisions as well. Although the
Agreement on Safeguards in the WTO contains
elements that may form the basis for safeguard
provisions in preferential trade arrangements,
the LDCs would have liked to see a number of
its provisions rewritten in order to allow for
more differential and favourable treatment of
the LDCs. 
Unfortunately, graduation from the UN list is
not a relevant issue for most LDCs in the
foreseeable future. After a country has
graduated, we recommend that trade
preferences should be retained until fixed
investments are fully depreciated, e.g. for a
period of 10–20 years, in order to reduce the
costs of adjustment. Moreover, there should be
no gradual increase of import restrictions
during the transition period. 
The present rules of origin in the importing
countries are a major obstacle to the realisation
of the benefits of duty-free and quota-free
market access for LDCs, especially in the
clothing sector.
Summary chapter by chapter
Chapter 2: Current trade barriers for Least
Developed Countries
• All QUAD countries presently provide
preferential market access for LDCs under
their respective Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP). Moreover, all LDCs but
the Asian ones, benefit from the Cotonou
Agreement with the EU, and Sub-Saharan
LDCs benefit from special arrangements in
the USA under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act. This means that duty-free
and quota-free access typically will be of
less value for the LDCs than for other
developing countries.
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• The scope and depth of the preferential
trade agreements vary greatly within the
QUAD. The broad pattern is as follows: 
The EU market has been quite open for the
LDCs for a long time. All industrial products
have been liberalised, along with a number
of agricultural products. However, there
have been import restrictions on products
that come under the Common Agricultural
Policy, notably for rice, sugar, bananas,
maize, meat and dairy products. After the
recent approval of the (revised)
“everything-but-arms” initiative, only rice,
sugar and bananas are not fully liberalised.   
The USA has a restrictive import policy for
textiles and clothing. But most agricultural
products that have been restricted in the
EU have enjoyed duty-free access in the US.
However, there are import quotas for meat,
dairy products, peanuts, sugar and tobacco. 
Japan has a quite liberal trade policy
towards LDCs in the industrial sector.
There are restrictions on imports of leather
products and a tax on petroleum. Textile
imports from LDCs are subject to
constraints as well, although these barriers
will be removed shortly. The agricultural
sector in Japan is heavily protected, and
only a few product categories are granted
duty-free and quota-free access. 
Canada’s import regime is similar to the
American one, but it is even more
restrictive. There are tarif fs and tarif f
quotas on a number of agricultural products
(e.g. dairy products, poultry products,
eggs, margarine, wheat, barley, beef and a
number of vegetables). Out-of-quota tariffs
are extremely high for meat and dairy
products. Although most industrial
products are liberalised, there are severe
import barriers on products that are of
great importance for LDCs, such as textiles,
clothing and footwear. 
• A brief assessment of the market access
opportunities in the neighbouring countries
of the LDCs in southern Africa shows that
tarif fs are high in certain product
categories. But this is probably not the main
explanation for the low level of intra-
regional trade in this region. Other major
reasons are a poorly developed infra-
structure (especially for food transport) as
well as the fact that many of the countries
specialise in the same kind of products. 
Chapter 3: Benefits for LDCs of trade liberalisation
• Potential benefits of duty-free and quota-
free access include: 1) Higher prices on
existing exports, 2) Price gains from
diverting sales from other markets (other
export markets or domestic markets) to the
QUAD countries, 3) Increased value added
through expansion of production. In
addition, consumer welfare in the LDCs
might be af fected by price changes.
Consumer prices may rise or fall depending
on domestic policies in the LDCs.
• Most of the current exports from LDCs to
the QUAD countries are duty-free. The
prices for existing exports are therefore not
likely to increase much. The most notable
exceptions are exports of apparel to USA
and Canada. We have calculated the
maximal price gain on existing exports to
about 220 mill. USD, most of which will
accrue to Bangladesh and other clothing
exporting countries in Asia. This gain
amounts to 1.1% of total exports and 0.13% of
total GDP in the LDCs. 
• A full analysis of the potential gains from
diverting sales from other markets to the
QUAD markets has not been possible to
undertake due to a lack of data. However,
some illustrative examples indicate that the
potential gains from redirecting existing
exports will be quite small, mainly because
products that face high trade barriers in the
QUAD countries rarely are exported to non-
QUAD countries on a large scale. The
reason is that non-QUAD countries also
have high trade barriers, and if they do not,
it is because their domestic producers are
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competitive enough to keep the LDCs out of
the market.
• Preferential access for agricultural products
in the EU and Japan may potentially lead to
large income gains for LDCs if they engage
in triangular trade, i.e. by exporting their
own production to the QUAD countries and
satisfying domestic demand with imports.
Rough estimates for 14 agricultural
products show that if 10% of present
production quantities are exported to the
EU in this way, the gains could by far
exceed the gains from higher prices on
existing exports. 
Whether the LDCs will be able (and willing)
to export such quantities is far from clear,
however.  This would require substantial
investments both in physical infrastructure
and logistics for imports and exports, and
inspection bodies would be needed in order
to ensure compliance with sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations in the importing
countries, since import/export swaps are
most likely for agricultural goods.
Moreover, considerations about food supply
security may make LDCs reluctant to
engage in import/export swaps in food
products on a large scale. 
Others have estimated the potential
increase in export revenue from removing
all tariff peaks in the QUAD to 2.5 billion
USD, i.e. an 11% increase. Most of the gain
comes from increased access for clothing
products in the US. There are also
significant benefits in the exports of sugar
and tobacco.  We consider the estimate of
the gain in the clothing sector to be too
optimistic because LDC clothing exporters
will have difficulties in complying with the
rules of origin in the QUAD markets. 
LDCs may not be the sole beneficiaries of
improved market access for their goods in
the QUAD, and producers of exports in
these countries may not see the profitability
of their activities increase if preferential
margins in the QUAD improve. The first
issue is important for the magnitude of the
static gains to LDCs from improved market
access. The second issue is of interest from
a dynamic perspective; the degree to which
the benefits of improved market access are
passed on to the producers will determine
the supply response which is crucial for the
impact such changes will have on income
levels in the LDCs in the future.
• Both state trading enterprises and
multinational companies are major actors in
important world markets for agricultural
goods. However, little is known about the
details of their operations and the roles they
play have not been subjected to stringent
analyses. 
• Since state trading enterprises in many
cases have special privileges, concerns have
recently been raised that they might
interfere unduly with trade. State trading
enterprises in many LDCs do seem to be
involved in exports of a broad range of
products. However, not much is known
about the nature of their involvement,
which most likely varies from country to
country.
• It seems likely that multinational companies
wield some market power. There is some
indirect evidence that this is the case;
increases in world market prices of six
major commodities are much more easily
transmitted to consumer prices in six major
OECD countries than decreases are.
Moreover, Europe has seen an increase in
the degree of concentration at the retail
level in recent years.
• Unless governments in LDCs use trade
policies to ensure that their producers will
continue to serve domestic markets to
some degree even after improved market
access has increased prices in export
markets, consumers in these countries are
unlikely to be much affected. Producers will
benefit to the extent that governments do
not tax away the gains. The distributional
ef fects will in this case depend on how
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factor markets work. For example, the gains
estimated for producers of apparel might
lead to higher wages for unskilled workers
if the labour market is reasonably efficient;
if not, unemployment might decrease and
profits increase instead. For such reasons,
accurate assessments of the consequences
for wages, profits and returns on land can
only be made in specific cases.
Chapter 4: How can the benefits be secured?
• Extending product coverage of the
preferential schemes in the US and Canada
and liberalising rules of origin stand out as
the measures that would bring the greatest
benefits for the LDCs in the short run. The
potential for significant export growth is
greatest in the textile and clothing sectors,
which are heavily protected in the USA and
Canada, and which are constrained by the
present rules of origin in developed
countries. 
• Binding tarif fs and procedures would
reduce uncertainties about future trade
preferences. This could stimulate
investments in supply capacity, which is
urgently needed in order for the LDCs to
take advantage of their trade preferences. 
However, the positive ef fect of binding
could easily be overstated. LDC investors
often face large uncertainties in other areas,
which may be far more discouraging for
investment incentives. Moreover, binding
duty-free and quota-free access will never
eliminate uncertainty about preference
margins, as long as MFN tariffs are subject
to negotiations.
• The simplest way to bind tariffs would be
for each of the preference granting
countries to notify the WTO that their GSP
schemes should be considered as binding
within the WTO framework. There are a
number of other alternatives as well,
including plurilateral and multilateral
agreements on binding tarif fs and/or
procedures. 
• Safeguard mechanisms play an important
role in the trade liberalisation process. By
leaving a line of retreat open to the
importing countries, safeguards allow them
to reduce the level of tariffs below what it
otherwise would be. Safeguards are likely
to play a more important role in preferential
trade arrangements if tariffs are bound. 
• From the point of view of the LDCs,
safeguards should be designed to achieve
their objectives for the importing country at
the smallest possible costs for the
exporters. It follows from this principle that
safeguards that apply to preferential trade
should 
– Address a well-defined, serious injury in
the importing country; 
– Be based on a clear and restrictive
definition of serious injury;
– Not be applied without a proven, causal
link between LDC imports and the
injury;
– Specify generous limits for LDC market
shares and LDC import growth below
which the LDC will not be targeted by
safeguards;
– Not limit the overall size of the market
more than necessary;
– Not prevent LDCs from capturing
market shares from other exporters;
– Not be implemented without
compensation to the LDCs.
• Rules of origin are a necessary part of any
preferential trade agreement. But the
present complexity and restrictiveness of
rules of origin in developed countries
represent an unnecessary barrier to trade
and might considerably reduce the gains for
LDCs of duty-free and quota-free access.
Improvement for LDCs could be achieved
by using “change of tarif f heading” as a
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criterion to determine origin and by not
requiring more than a single tariff jump in
order to become eligible for preferential
treatment. 
• The possibility of graduating from
preferential trade arrangements may create
a disincentive to utilise the preferences.
This is not a major problem at present,
however, mainly because most LDCs are
very far away from the graduation limits
defined by the UN.
• After a country has graduated, we
recommend that trade preferences should
be retained until fixed investments are fully
depreciated, e.g. for a period of 10–20 years,
in order to reduce the costs of adjustment.
Moreover, there should be no gradual
increase of import restrictions during the
transition period. Finally, sector-wise
graduation should not be applied to LDCs
because most LDCs produce an extremely
narrow range of export commodities. 
Appendix 3: Supply capacity in the Least Developed
Countries
• The share of exports in GDP is lower in
LDCs than in low-income countries. Low
productive capacity is a major explanation
for the weak performance of the export
sectors of LDCs. However, it is likely that
the lack of export infrastructure, such as
institutions for quality control, contributes
to the poor performance as well.
• Productivity is low in LDCs, particularly
with respect to labour. This is due to low
levels of both physical and human capital.
Moreover, total factor productivity is low,
presumably due to factors such as outdated
technologies and inefficient allocation of
resources across sectors. 
• Since the accumulation of productive
inputs, the allocation of them across sectors
and the adoption of new technology depend
on the incentives for taking these actions,
governments have an important role to play
in increasing capacity through economic
policies which influence these incentives.
Furthermore, public investments in
infrastructure, health and education could
potentially boost productivity considerably.
• Rates of investment hold out the prospect of
a reasonably rapid expansion of capacity in
the coming years. However, the foundation
on which accumulation is currently based is
weak. LDCs are not attractive targets for
foreign investors at present. Their financial
sectors are underdeveloped. Moreover,
their average rate of saving is negative. This
means that foreigners are financing today’s
investment. In fact, the source of funds is
almost exclusively foreign governments.
However, aid flows are dwindling.
Furthermore, debt levels are high, and the
extent to which debt relief will be provided
is unclear. Thus, it is uncertain whether the
investment levels can be sustained without
substantial increases in both private and
public savings rates. Furthermore, a major
unresolved issue is the degree to which
investment (in particular in the public
sector) is efficient in LDCs.
• Viewed in isolation, improving access to
export markets increases the incentives to
invest in export capacity. However,
investment decisions hinge on a number of
factors, and with respect to many of these
LDCs are not faring very well. In particular,
the macroeconomic environment is
extremely volatile. While the terms of trade
are beyond control, donors could contribute
by providing more stable aid flows to
governments which pursue well-founded
economic policies, and governments should
aim at keeping the real exchange rate as
stable as possible.  
• In order to significantly expand exports,
LDCs need to build an infrastructure that
can facilitate the flow of market information
to producers, enforce the sanitary and
phytosanitary standards of the importing
countries, and implement quality control
more generally. Donors could aid LDCs by
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providing technical assistance in these
matters. 
• Economic policy reform, particularly with
respect to public finances and financial
sector regulation, is another key issue in
capacity building. Whether such reforms
will materialise is hard to predict. However,
even if they do, it seems unlikely that LDC
production for exports will increase
substantially in the short to medium term,
given the current situation.
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The Least Developed Countries are the poorest
countries in the world. They are of ficially
designated as “least developed” by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on the basis of
a number of agreed criteria. There are currently
48 such countries, with a combined population
of 613.5 million, or 13.1% of the total population
in all developing countries. Their average GDP
per capita is 287 dollars, or less than a dollar a
day (UNCTAD 2000).
The LDCs’ share of the world economy has
been declining over the years. Their share of
world exports has declined from 0.8% in 1980 to
less than 0.5% today (WTO 1997). They also
have much slower economic growth than other
developing countries. The average growth in
real GDP per capita in 1990–98 was 0.9% in the
LDCs compared to 3.1% in all developing
countries. Thus, the LDCs are lagging behind.
Policies that prevent further marginalisation of
these countries are therefore most welcome.
Several initiatives have been taken in recent
years in order to reduce trade barriers for
exports from LDCs. Some of these initiatives
can be traced back to the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Singapore in 1996, where the
WTO members agreed to a plan of action to
favour LDCs, “...including provisions for taking
positive measures, for example duty-free access on
an autonomous basis”. The most radical proposal
that has been put for th in the wake of this
declaration is to eliminate import quotas and
bind all import tariffs on LDC imports at zero
rates in the WTO. This proposal has been
voiced both by the former and the present WTO
General Director and by the LDCs themselves. 
Although the WTO member countries have not
yet followed up the Directors’ proposal on
multilateral solutions, some of them have taken
separate initiatives on an autonomous basis.
During the preparations for the 1999 Ministerial
Conference in Seattle, the EU proposed the
granting of duty-free access for “essentially all
products” from LDCs. And to some extent, the
EU talks have been followed by action. A revised
version of the EU proposal was recently adopted
by the European Council, promising duty-free
and quota-free access for all products except
arms within 2009 (European Commission
2001b). Furthermore, both Canada and Japan
have extended – or are in the process of
extending – duty-free access for LDCs to a
broader range of products, and last year the
USA liberalised clothing imports from Sub-
Saharan Africa through the African Trade and
Opportunity Act. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the
economic impacts on the LDCs of dif ferent
policies that reduce the trade barriers LDCs
would normally face in their export markets.
The various proposals differ greatly in scope
and depth, as well as in terms of the legal and
institutional structures involved. This is a signal
that it will be difficult for the LDCs to obtain all
the concessions they want in every area of
concern. This study therefore aims to suggest
what the key priorities for LDCs should be in a
process of gradual trade liberalisation in their
export markets. 
This study was commissioned by the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
mandate of the study is presented in Appendix
4. A short version of the mandate, together with
our interpretations of some key elements, is
presented below. 
The mandate in brief
According to the mandate, the study should,
with reference to the current trade barriers the
LDCs face, assess the economic impacts for the
LDCs of two alternative future policy regimes:
(1) Duty-free access for all products from LDCs,
and
(2) Duty-free access for “essentially all”
products from LDCs
1 Background and Purpose of the Study
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The study should assess consequences of duty-
free access for LDCs in the industrialised
countries as well as in both industrialised
countries and other developing countries.
Economic outcomes include both the
consequences for the LDC economy in general,
for sectors of particular interest and for income
distribution. 
The study should also include a discussion of
the following aspects of preferential trade
arrangements: product coverage, binding in the
WTO, safeguards used in the importing
countries, transition rules related to graduation
from LDC status and the question of rules of
origin. 
Interpretations
A quantitative assessment of the second policy
alternative is not possible due to the inherent
ambiguity of the statement “essentially all
products”. We have circumvented this problem
by emphasising the product categories in which
full duty-free and quota-free market access will
bring the largest gains to the LDCs. In this way,
we are able to identify the likely consequences
of exemptions from completely free market
access.
“Duty-free” is taken to imply both duty-free and
quota-free market access.  
With regard to country coverage, it has not
been possible within the time frame of this study
to analyse the consequences of lifting trade
barriers in all industrialised and (non-LDC)
developing countries. We have therefore
concentrated on the major export markets for
the LDCs, i.e. the EU, the USA, Japan and
Canada. We have also investigated the
possibilities for enhanced South-South trade
within the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). 
We interpret the mandate to say that the LDCs
should be treated as a group. Country specific
consequences are therefore mentioned only
occasionally. 
With regard to types of economic outcomes,
“consequences for the LDC economy in
general” are taken to mean the impacts on GDP
and export revenue.
The study aims to address the issue of market
access from an LDC point of view, especially
when it comes to the questions of product
coverage, binding, safeguards, graduation, and
rules of origin.
The mandate allows for discussions of relevant
issues that are not explicitly mentioned in the
mandate. Against this background we have
included an extensive appendix on supply
constraints in the LDCs (Appendix 3). It appears
that such constraints put severe limitations on
the ability of the LDCs to take advantage of
preferential trade arrangements.  Identifying
and addressing the supply constraints should
therefore be an integral part of any trade
liberalisation initiatives for LDCs.
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In order to evaluate the consequences for the
Least Developed Countries of eliminating duties
and quotas in their export markets, we need to
have a solid understanding of the restrictiveness
of the present trade regime. This is the subject
of Chapter 2. 
Investigating the restrictiveness of a given trade
policy is a major challenge from a
methodological point of view. The problem is
that we ideally want to see the nominal trade
barriers in light of the export potential of the
LDCs because only trade barriers on products
where LDCs have an export potential make a
dif ference. However, we have limited
information about export potential, since a low
level of actual exports may be a consequence of
high trade barriers rather than a sign of limited
export potential. 
There is no straightforward solution to this
problem. We have therefore adopted a dual
approach. As a point of departure, we assess the
trade barriers in those product categories
where LDCs currently have their largest
exports. The obvious problem with this
approach is that it runs the risk of overlooking
the significance of prohibitive trade barriers.
Throughout the analysis, we will therefore also
keep an eye on trade barriers that are of a
prohibitive nature in areas where LDCs may be
expected to have a comparative advantage, even
though current exports are limited (e.g. certain
agricultural products). 
Trade policies vary greatly among the export
markets of LDCs. It is therefore appropriate to
describe trade policies on an individual country
basis. But since the number of importing
countries is very large, we need to restrict
ourselves to the most important ones. As shown
in Section 2.1, the major markets for LDC
exports are in the QUAD (the EU, the USA,
Japan and Canada). By focusing on import
barriers in these countries, little attention will
be devoted to the trade barriers faced by LDCs
in other developing countries in general.
However, for the sake of illustration, we have
included an assessment of the trade barriers the
LDCs face in the SADC region with respect to
intra-regional trade in southern Africa. 
2.1 Major export markets for Least
Developed Countries
The most important markets for the LDCs – in
descending order of magnitude – are the EU,
the USA, Japan and Canada, which together
represent about 65% of LDC exports (UNCTAD
2000a).1
The EU is by far the single most important
trading partner for the LDCs. While developing
countries in general export 19% of their goods to
the EU, the share for the LDCs is 35%. A major
explanation for the close trading relationship
between the EU and the LDCs, apart from close
political relations in the past, is the relatively
generous preferential market access that most
LDCs have enjoyed in the EU. African LDCs are
typically more dependent on the EU market
than are other LDCs. Most African countries
ship more than 50% of their exports to EU. 
The USA/Canada are also important trading
partners for some LDCs. These markets
represent 23% of total LDC exports, of which
more than nine tenths are for the US market.
Note, however, that the LDC imports in these
markets are very unevenly distributed across
the LDCs. In 1999, only two countries (Angola
and Bangladesh) accounted for 65% of US
imports from LDCs (USITC 2001). 
2 Current Trade Barriers for Least Developed Countries
1) According to UN COMTRADE data, the Quad share of total LDC exports in 1996–98 was as high as 75% (reported in Hoekman
et al. 2001).
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Relative to its size, the Japanese market has
traditionally not been among the most
important markets for LDCs, currently
importing only 5% of LDC exports. Limited
market access for agricultural products is
probably one of the explanations. The
importance of the Japanese market may
therefore increase as trade barriers are lifted.
2.2 Major export commodities 
In terms of aggregate export values, the major
export commodities in the LDCs are petroleum
and apparel, accounting for more than 45% of
total exports. However, most LDCs export
neither petroleum nor apparel. The petroleum
exports are from Angola and a few other Central
African countries, and the exports of apparel are
completely dominated by the Asian LDCs and
by Bangladesh in particular. 
Most LDCs export products such as minerals,
raw materials and tropical agricultural products
(cof fee, sugar, vegetables, fruits and nuts,
tobacco). 
Figure 2.1 Major export markets for LDCs
Source: UNCTAD (2000). 
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2.3 Trade barriers in the QUAD countries
This section reviews the trade policies towards
LDCs in each of the QUAD markets. Before
turning to the details, let us highlight some
general aspects of the current policies. 
• Agricultural products, textiles and clothing
are the most heavily protected products in
the QUAD markets. 
• The trade barriers in each of the mentioned
product categories dif fer substantially
among the QUAD countries. High trade
barriers are found for textiles and clothing
in the USA and Canada. Canada and Japan
have also established quite restrictive
import regimes in the agricultural sector.
The EU also has a few substantive trade
barriers in the agricultural sector, although
the overall market access in the EU is better
than in the other QUAD markets.
• All regions have some kind of preferential
treatment of LDCs. Preferences are
typically granted on a unilateral and
autonomous basis through the GSP
framework. Furthermore, the EU grants
preferences on a more contractual basis to
the ACP countries through the Cotonou
Agreement.2
• Not all countries that are designated LDC
status by the UN actually receive LDC
preferences in the QUAD countries.
Political reasons are the common grounds
for rejecting LDC treatment, as in the case
of Myanmar. 
• Not all countries that receive LDC
preferences are necessarily treated the
same. In the USA, African LDCs enjoy more
favourable treatment than the Asian LSCs in
the clothing sector (through the African
Table 2.1 Major export commodities from LDCs (1996–98 average)
Source: Hoekman et al. (2001), computed from UN COMTRADE.
HS Product LDC exports Share of total Export to Quad as
code (mill. USD) LDC exports (%) share of total (%)
27 Mineral fuels, oil & prod. 5958 26.2 66.2
62 Art. of apparel & clothing access 2702 11.9 96.6
71 Natural/cultured pearls, precious stones 2094 9.2 95.3
61 Art. of apparel & clothing access 1776 7.8 96.1
9 Coffee, tea, matè and spices 1407 6.2 83.8
3 Fish & crustacean, molluscs 1307 5.7 85.6
52 Cotton 893 3.9 45.6
26 Ores, slag and ash 758 3.3 96.5
89 Ships, boats and floating structures 632 2.8 24.7
44 Wood and articles of wood 622 2.7 46.0
24 Tobacco and manufactured 405 1.8 77.1
74 Copper and articles thereof 387 1.7 54.2
41 Raw hides and skin 322 1.4 61.0
12 Oil seed, oleagi fruits; misc. grains 283 1.2 71.5
81 Other base metals 278 1.2 92.3
8 Edible fruits and nuts; melons 257 1.1 36.5
7 Edible vegetables and roots & tubers 251 1.1 28.1
All other products 2442 10.7 67.6
Total 22772 100 75.2
2) The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and some 70 former colonies and territories in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific
grants generous trade preferences and provides for financial assistance on a contractual basis. Most LDCs, except the Asian ones,
are included in the ACP group.
In 1996, 71% of the imports to the US paid zero
duties.4 14% were imported duty-free under
MFN conditions. The most important products
in this category, in descending order of import
values, are diamonds, aluminium ore, frozen
shrimps and prawns, cobalt and coffee. The US
GSP system extended duty-free access to an
additional 56% of the imports. Although the GSP
covers a large share of US imports, the range of
products and export countries that actually
benefits from GSP treatment is extremely
narrow. As much as 95% of the GSP covered
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Growth and Opportunity Act3). And in the
EU, non-ACP LDCs have not enjoyed quite
as liberal market access as the ACP
countries. The Everything-But-Arms
initiative will however bring this
discrimination to an end.  
• Stringent rules of origin reduce the value of
the preferential agreements for the LDCs,
in particular for such industrial products as
textiles and clothing.
• Preferential trade arrangements are
commonly used for non-trade purposes,
such as to ensure compliance with human
rights or social standards. This adds to the
unpredictability of preferential margins. 
2.3.1 Market access in the US
The US imports from LDCs amounted to 4.8
billion USD in 1996 (OECD 1997). LDCs face
significant trade barriers in the US for textiles
and clothing but enjoy quite generous access for
agricultural products through the GSP system. 
The US imports from LDCs are characterised
by huge imports of petroleum from a few
African countries and substantial imports of
clothing from Bangladesh and a few other Asian
LDCs. 
3) The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), adopted in 2000, provides preferential market access for countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the US clothing market. Due to strict rules of origin for non-LDCs and the lack of export capacity in Sub-Saharan
LDCs, the AGOA is not expected to provide large benefits for the countries in the region.  
4) Throughout Section 2.3, figures for GSP-covered products are based on eligibility of GSP treatment and not on received GSP
treatment. It is well known that the utilisation rate of the GSP system is low in many countries (see Section 5.4 and UNCTAD 1999d).
Figure 2.2 US imports from LDCs
Source: UNCTAD (2000). 
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imports are petroleum. Since Angola alone
accounts for 95% of total LDC exports of crude
petroleum to the US market (USITC 2001), it
should be evident that the US GSP scheme is
not of great value to the average Least
Developed Country.
The value of the GSP system cannot be
evaluated only on the basis of trade values; the
preference margin must also be taken into
account. Calculations of the tarif f revenues
foregone show that 51% of the US GSP
preferences are related to tobacco imports,
while only 39% stem from preferences on
petroleum, where the preference margin is less
than 1%.5
Textiles and clothing are the most significant
product groups that are excluded from GSP
treatment in the US. In fact, these products are
non-eligible for GSP treatment by law. Textiles
and clothing face both tarif f and non-tarif f
barriers. Practically all LDC imports to the US
under ordinary duties, which constitute 29% of
the US imports from LDCs, are clothing from
Bangladesh and a few other Asian LDCs. The
rates of duties vary between 3% and 30%, with an
average tarif f rate of 12% (OECD 1997). In
addition to tariffs, there are quotas on imports
of textiles and clothing under the Multifiber
Agreement up to 2005. The quota utilisation rate
is close to 100% for a number of products,
indicating that they pose a real constraint on
LDC exports (Otexa 2000). 
Sub-Saharan countries have recently received
preferential access to the US clothing market
through the African Trade and Opportunity Act
(AGOA). African LDCs may obtain duty-free,
but not quota-free access for apparel made from
fabric originating anywhere in the world until
September 30 2004. But Asian LDCs, which are
the countries that have the resources needed to
export these products, still have to pay ordinary
duties. 
By studying the tariffs and quotas of products
that actually are imported from LDCs, we run
the risk of overlooking prohibitive trade
barriers. The US imports of agricultural
products from the LDCs are very low in most
product categories, and we have therefore
investigated the nominal agricultural trade
barriers in order to find significant trade
barriers. In most product groups, the LDCs
enjoy duty-free access6. However, there are
import quotas in some important product
categories such as meat, dairy products,
peanuts, sugar and tobacco. Out-of-quota tariffs
are significant in some cases, especially for
some tobacco products. Thus, although there
are exceptions, high trade barriers in the US
agricultural sector do not in general seem to
represent a significant problem for LDCs. LDC
agricultural products are simply not competitive
in the US market and/or enjoy better market
conditions in other markets (e.g. Europe). 
2.3.2 Market access in the EU
The EU countries imported goods from LDCs
for 9.1 billion USD in 1996 (OECD 1997), almost
twice the value of the US imports. The EU
imports from LDCs are significantly more
diversified than the US imports, both in terms of
product spectre and countries of origin. 
After the recent approval of the Everything-But-
Arms initiative, LDCs enjoy free market access
in the EU, except for rice, sugar and bananas.
The import restrictions in the remaining
categories will be phased out by 2006 (bananas)
and 2009 (rice and sugar). In the meantime,
import quotas for these three products will be
gradually expanded.
5) Calculations are based on the mean applied MFN rate for each product group (OECD 1997). The total revenue foregone due
to GSP preferences is about 53 million USD (assuming a constant trade volume). 
6) The main exceptions are sweet corn (21.3%), dried onions (29.8%) and dried garlic (29.8%), whereas there are some very low
specific tariffs on tomatoes, cucumbers and certain citrus fruits.
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In this study, we evaluate the effect of lifting the
trade barriers that existed before the adoption
of the EBA initiative. Therefore, we need to
describe the preceding trade regime as well. 
In 1996, 99% of the EU imports from LDCs
entered free of duty. 53% were duty-free under
MFN rates. The most important products in this
category were diamonds, cof fee, crude
petroleum, cotton and various minerals and ores
(WTO 1997). Furthermore, an extensive GSP
scheme granted free market access to LDCs for
all industrial products, including textiles and
clothing. Fish, fish products and most
agricultural products were included in the GSP
scheme as well. But, unlike the US where there
is duty-free access for all products eligible for
GSP treatment, the GSP scheme in the EU has
included positive – and indeed quite high – tariff
rates for some product categories. 
In the agricultural sector, there were 919 tariff
lines where LDCs did not enjoy free market
access. In 835 of these tarif f lines there are
presently no LDC imports (European
Commission 2000). There are only 19 tariff lines
with total imports exceeding 100 000 EUR and
nine tariff lines with imports exceeding 500 000
EUR. Table 2.2 reports the import restrictions
in these nine tarif f lines. These products
combined accounted for 95% of the imports of
non-liberalised products in 1998. 
We note that not all LDCs are treated equally.
Traditionally, the ACP countries have enjoyed
more liberal market access in the EU than non-
ACP LDCs through the Lomé Conventions, now
being replaced by the Cotonou Agreement.
Much of this discrimination was eliminated
when the EU in 1998 extended Lomé preference
to all LDCs for all products that are not
encompassed by import quotas. 
Figure 2.3 EU imports from LDCs
Sources: OECD (1997) and European Commission (2000a). 
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The explanation why there are few imports to
the EU of non-liberalised products can either be
that the import barriers are prohibitive or that
the LDCs lack export capacity. Most likely it is a
combination of these two factors. Some of the
non-liberalised products, such as rice, maize,
meat, dairy products, tomatoes and some fruits
are produced in significant quantities in the
LDCs and may therefore potentially benefit
from improved market access. It should be
noted, however, that all cereals from LDCs
already enter the US market free of duty, and
the same is true for meat and dairy products
within given quotas. The fact that LDCs do not
export these products to the US market may
therefore be a sign of weak export capacity. 
The Cotonou Agreement provides special
market access conditions for sugar, beef and
veal to a limited number of ACP countries.
Countries that have quotas under the sugar
protocol are guaranteed payment according to
the price paid to EU farmers. However, these
provisions are not of great value to many LDCs.
Only four LDCs (Madagascar, Malawi,
Tanzania, and Uganda) have quotas under the
sugar protocol, and the quotas are very small
compared to the production capacities of these
countries (<10%) (FAO 2001, ACP 2001). When
it comes to the protocol on beef and veal, there
is only one LDC (Madagascar) that benefits
from reduced tariffs within a specified quota.
Overall, therefore, the protocols of the Cotonou
Agreement do not offer great benefits to LDCs.   
2.3.3 Market access in Japan
Japan imports for about 1.5 billion USD annually
from LDCs, which is no more than one sixth of
the value of the EU imports. More than 50% of
the imports are duty-free under MFN tariffs.
Among the most important products in this
category are copper, cobalt, coffee, wood and
tobacco (WTO 1997). 
A further 14% is imported free of charge under
the Japanese GSP scheme. The duty-free GSP
import is dominated by one single product;
octopus imported from Mauritania and Gambia.
This product alone accounts for 79% of the duty-
free GSP imports.
As much as 33% of Japan’s imports from LDCs
are dutiable at ordinary rates. The main product
groups in this category are petroleum, fish and
other sea products. The tariff rates for fish and
other sea products are in the 2% to 15% range.
Table 2.2 Import tariffs in EU on major non-liberalised products, 2000
Sources: European Commission (2000a) and Taric (2000). 
Tariffs (EUR/tonne)
HS code Product Imports 1998 (1000 EUR) GSP-LDC ACP
04051030 Recombined butter 970 1611 1592
04069021 Cheddar 1976 1671 Q: 584 
1671
07099060 Sweet corn 1662 94 92
08030019 Bananas 4420 Q: 75 Q: Free
680 480
10070090 Grain sorghum 2231 94 P: 37.6 
94
17011110 Raw cane sugar, for refining 29957 339 Q: Free 
339
17011190 Raw cane sugar, not for refining 13587 419 Q: Free 
419
17019910 White sugar 6905 419 Q: Free (cane) 
419
17031000 Cane molasses 12336 3.5 Q: Free 
3.5
Q: Within quota tariff rate
P: Tariff within preferential ceiling
28
The agricultural sector in Japan is heavily
protected, and prohibitive trade barriers are
encountered in a number of sectors (see Table
2.3). There is a positive list of agricultural and
fish products that are eligible for GSP
treatment, which in the case of LDCs implies
duty-free and quota-free access. These products,
such as certain fish products, vegetables,
bananas, fruits and nuts, cof fee and tea
products, all face relatively low MFN tariffs. 
Figure 2.4 Japan’s imports from LDCs
Source: OECD (1997).
Table 2.3 Trade barriers in agriculture in Japan
Source: GTAP version 4.





Bovine meat and meat products 48.1
LDCs enjoy duty-free and quota-free access for
most industrial products in Japan, with the
exceptions of leather products and footwear.
Textiles also face tariffs at present, but these
tariffs will be removed in April 2001, implying
that all import of textiles and clothing from
LDCs will be duty- and quota-free. 
2.3.4 Market access in Canada
The Canadian market is by far the smallest of
the QUAD markets. Total imports from LDCs in
1996 were 0.3 billion USD, i.e. only 3.5% of the
EU imports. Nevertheless, Canada collects
duties on their LDC imports that exceed the
total duties collected by the EU and Japan (see
Chapter 3). Further trade liberalisation in
Canada is therefore of potentially greater
importance than the trade figures may seem to
indicate.  
Most of Canada’s LDC imports (78%) are in
product categories that are duty-free under
MFN rules. The most important products in this
category are petroleum, minerals and ores,
coffee and frozen shrimps and prawns (WTO,
1997). Only an additional 1% of the imports are
duty-free under the GSP scheme. The Canadian
GSP-scheme is thus of very little significance in
providing duty-free access to LDCs. 
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As is the case in the USA, the import regime in
Canada is characterised by high barriers in the
textile and clothing sector. Textiles and clothing
constitute about 20% of Canada’s imports from
LDCs, and most of this import is levied at a rate
between 20% and 25%.
Canada also has fairly high trade barriers in the
agricultural sector. There are tariffs and tariff
quotas on a number of agricultural products
(e.g. dairy products, poultry products, eggs,
margarine, wheat, barley and beef, and a
number of vegetables). Out-of-quota tariffs are
extremely high for meat and dairy products.
2.3.5 Regional market access in southern Africa
As an illustrative example of the trade barriers
faced by LDCs in their regional markets, we will
present indicative data on the trade barriers
faced by LDCs in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) region. The
SADC is composed of both LDCs (Angola, Dem.
Rep. of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Tanzania and Zambia) and non-LDCs (South
Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe,
Swaziland and Mauritius). Efforts have been
made to stimulate trade relations among the
SADC members. Nevertheless, only about 5% of
SADC exports are intra-regional trade (Yeats
1998). In fact, this figure is even lower for the
LDCs in the region.7 This is in stark contrast to
the usual pattern found in developed countries,
where neighbouring countries usually are
important trading partners. 
Can the low level of intra-regional exports from
these countries be explained by high import
tariffs? Unfortunately, available protection data
are scarce at this level. Some indicative figures
can, nevertheless, be obtained from the GTAP
database, where the SADC countries are divided
into two groups; the South African Customs
Union (SACU) and the Rest of Southern Africa.
All members of SACU, except Lesotho, are non-
LDCs, while all countries in Rest of Southern
Africa are LDCs, except Zimbabwe and
Mauritius. We have used the tarif fs Rest of
Southern Africa faces as indicative of the tariffs
faced by LDCs in the SADC. 
Table 2.4 shows the average applied MFN rates
faced by countries in Rest of Southern Africa
when exporting to the QUAD, the SACU and to
other countries in Rest of Southern Africa.
Although, average MFN tarif fs are lower in
regional trade than in QUAD markets, there are
Figure 2.5 Canada’s imports from LDCs
Source: OECD (1997).
7) Sources: Own calculations based on World Bank (2000) and trade figures provided by SADC.  
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many product categories where the opposite is
the case.8 Thus, one cannot rule out that high
tariffs are part of the explanation of low trade
volumes. Most likely, however, other obstacles
are far more important. 
Yeats (1998) has studied the reasons for the low
degree of intra-regional trade in Sub-Saharan
Africa. He concludes that the main reasons are
(1) lack of adequate infrastructure and (2) lack
of export products that other countries in the
region need to import. 
African infrastructure is poorly developed in
general, but the situation is even worse when it
comes to intra-regional trade. Transport routes
have been developed from the inland to the
coast, which does not make for easy
transportation between countries within the
region. The trade in food products especially
suffers from badly developed transportation
networks and storage opportunities. 
While the lack of infrastructure may be
amended through appropriate investments, it is
more difficult to overcome the second major
problem; the lack of compatible export
products. The resource base is quite similar
across many African countries. They therefore
tend to specialise in the same types of products,
which does not lead to much intra-regional
trade. 
8) Note that these figures do not account for preferential margins.
Table 2.4 Import tariffs facing rest of southern Africa in Three export regions (%)
Sources: GTAP version 4 and authors’ calculations.
QUAD SACU1 Rest Southern Africa2
Rice 0.0 11.1 1.4
Other cereals 44.4 -5.6 -7.3
Vegetables/fruit 4.4 13.8 10.6
Oilseeds 0.0 4.2 10.6
Sugar 75.6 0.2 10.6
Other crops 8.4 1.8 10.6
Meat 97.1 32.6 9.4
Other animal products 0.9 5.1 6.0
Other food 6.7 8.4 10.6
Fish 6.7 12.9 0.8
Forest 1.6 9.6 10.6
Beverages/tobacco 19.2 37.4 -3.4
Fuel/minerals 0.5 2.8 4.7
Textiles/clothing/leather 10.4 19.0 24.9
Other manufacturing 1.9 10.9 5.1
Total 13.4 9.4 5.5
1 SACU members: South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho.
2 Rest of Southern Africa: Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mauritius.
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This chapter reports on our evaluation of the
benefits for the LDCs of removing existing
tariffs and quotas in the QUAD markets. The
theoretical basis for the analysis is explained in
Section 3.1 and Appendix 2. Due to the lack of
reliable data, it is however not possible to
measure the consequences for the LDCs in a
way that is completely satisfactory from a
theoretical point of view. Therefore, we have to
rely on somewhat imprecise measures and
indicators. Three such measures are described
in Section 3.2, and the results are presented in
Sections 3.3 – 3.5. Issues of income distribution
are discussed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7
summarises our findings, emphasising the
implications of our results for the question
about product coverage in preferential trade
arrangements with LDCs.
3.1 Theory
The economic benefits of extending the LDC
trade preferences can be divided into three
components:
• The value of higher prices on existing
production and exports
• The value-added from production
expansions
• The benefits created for (or diverted from)
consumers in LDCs
Higher prices on existing production and exports
Trade preferences will increase the prices
received by LDC exporters. Import tariffs and
quotas raise the domestic price of goods in the
importing country above the world market
price. When LDC exporters are granted
preferential access, they get behind the tariff
walls and may thus charge a price that is higher
than the world market price and still be able to
sell their products in competition with other
countries. With free market access, the price
received by LDC exporters will equal the
domestic price in the importing country,
provided there is no market power on the
import side. Granting duty-free access to the
LDCs will thus increase the export price by the
present rates of duty. 
With market power on the import side, the price
increase will typically be less than the present
duty rates, as the importers will be able to
capture part of the potential gains from duty-
free access.  
The total value for the LDCs of higher prices on
existing production and exports depends on the
quantities exported into the markets where
preferential access is provided. Three cases can
be distinguished:
• No change in the export pattern.
The total gain is then the price increase
multiplied by existing export quantities
supplied to the markets where preferential
access is granted.
• Redirecting exports that presently enter other
markets.
By redirecting exports that presently enter
non-QUAD markets, the LDCs will obtain
additional gains from preferential access in
the QUAD. The extra value equals the price
difference between QUAD and non-QUAD
markets, multiplied by the export quantities
being redirected. 
• Redirecting existing sales from domestic LDC
markets to the QUAD.
If LDC producers receive higher prices in
the QUAD than in their respective home
markets, it will be profitable to redirect
goods that presently are sold in the home
markets to the QUAD markets. Domestic
consumption in the LDCs must then be
satisfied through imports from third
countries. This is called triangular trade or
an import/export swap. The use of
import/export swaps will further enhance
3 Benefits for LDCs of Trade Liberalisation
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the gains from preferential market access,
depending on the quantities redirected and
the difference between home market prices
in the LDCs and the prices received in the
QUAD markets. 
Value-added from production expansions
If higher prices for LDC exporters are
transferred to LDC producers (which is not
necessarily the case, as discussed in Section
3.6), there will be incentives to expand
production. Higher production creates both
extra revenues and extra costs. The gain for the
LDCs is the difference between the additional
revenues and the additional costs of production. 
The value-added from expanded production
depends crucially on the structure of costs.
Other things being equal, gains will be higher in
sectors with economies of scale, where unit
costs decline with output, than in sectors where
the unit costs increase as production expands.
Higher export revenues might also make it
possible to invest in new technologies that may
reduce production costs and enhance the
economic surplus. In some cases, the adoption
of new technologies might even create
beneficial spillovers to other industries, thus
further boosting the economic gains. 
Consumer welfare
Preferential market access for LDCs will benefit
LDC consumers, although the gains are likely to
be quite small. The effect on consumer welfare
depends on what happens to domestic prices in
the LDCs. Given that LDC production increases
in the wake of preferential, duty-free access,
there will be excess supply in the world
markets, putting downward pressure on world
market prices. A fall in world market prices will
benefit LDC consumers. But since the LDCs’
share of world markets in protected products in
most cases is very small, the decline in world
market prices will probably be negligible, and so
will be the effect on consumer welfare in LDCs. 
This argument presupposes that the LDCs do
no raise their own import tarif fs to prevent
import/export swaps. For some food products,
it may be undesirable for the LDCs to become
too reliant on supplies from third countries, as
might be the case if import/export swaps are
extensively used. In order to limit the degree of
import/export swaps, import tariffs could be
raised. That would increase the domestic price
level and thus induce domestic producers to
supply the home market. Such policies would
harm consumer welfare. However, for a country
that is a net exporter of the relevant commodity,
any consumer losses will be more than
outweighed by the benefits to producers.
Hence, everyone can be better of f if
redistribution policies are put in place. This
shows that the ef fect of preferential market
access on consumer welfare in LDCs depends to
a large extent on domestic policies in these
countries. 
A graphic exposition of the arguments of this
section is presented in Appendix 2.
3.2 Measuring the benefits – the
methodology
In order to arrive at a theoretically satisfactory
measure of the total gains for LDCs of duty-free
and quota-free access in the QUAD, we need
information about (see Appendix 2 for details):
• The price responsiveness of demand and
supply in the LDCs, import demand in the
QUAD countries and export supply in other
countries
• The quantities produced and consumed in
the LDCs
• The preference margin (measured in
absolute values)
Data are scarce in many of these areas, in
particular concerning price responsiveness. It
has not been possible, within the time frame of
this study, to undertake a comprehensive and
systematic numerical assessment of the gains
and losses for LDCs. Our approach is a more
pragmatic one, using available data to shed light
on the potential magnitudes involved. We
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provide three different types of measures of the
potential gains of duty-free access. We say
“potential” because all three measures assume
that there is no market power in importing
countries, implying that the LDCs receive the
entire preferential margin (see Section 3.6 for a
discussion of market power).
1. A measure of the potential gains from higher
prices on existing exports to QUAD.
This is a measure of the pure price effect of
higher prices on existing exports to the
QUAD. It does not take into account the
benefits of redirecting existing sales in non-
QUAD markets, nor the value added from
increased production. This measure may be
a reasonable indicator of the potential short-
run gains from duty-free market access,
given that import/export swaps are not
used.9 We have used data on existing
customs duties on LDC imports in the
QUAD in order to produce this measure.   
2. A measure of the potential gains from
redirecting existing sales in non-QUAD
markets (including the potential gains from
import/export swaps). 
In principle, the potential gains of
redirecting existing sales in non-QUAD
markets can be estimated by multiplying
the existing levels of sales with the
preferential margin in the QUAD under
duty-free access. In practice, however, it is
unrealistic to assume 100% utilisation of
import/export swaps. Our estimates are
therefore based on assumptions about less
than full utilisation of this possibility. Our
estimates are also confined to a limited
range of products; the lack of data has
prevented us from measuring the aggregate
gains over all product categories.10
3. A measure of the potential increase in export
revenues (including gains from higher prices
on existing exports and gains from increased
production).
The main problem with the two measures
above is that they do not take into account
potential value added from increased
production. Unfortunately, no estimate of
this value added is readily available.
However, Hoekman et al. (2001) provides
estimates of the potential increase in export
revenue from freer market access in the
QUAD. This measure overlaps the two
measures above, since benefits from higher
prices on existing exports are included. It
also includes a measure of the extra
revenues from increased production, but
the main problem is that it does not subtract
the extra costs generated by the production
increase. Note also that potential gains from
import/export swaps are not included.11
3.3 Measure I: The value of existing
customs duties 
The QUAD countries collect about 220 mill.
USD annually in customs duties on their
imports from LDCs. As shown in Figure 3.1,
more than 80% of these duties is collected by the
USA. Canada also collects a disproportionally
high share of the duties. The EU, while
representing almost 60% of the total QUAD
imports, collects less than 4% of the customs
duties.  
9) With reference to Figure A2.2 (see Appendix 2), this measure corresponds to the area C+F+G, which in principle may be
greater or smaller than the gains without import/export swap (i.e. B+C+D). 
10) With reference to Figure A2.2, this measure (assuming 100% utilisation of import/export swaps) corresponds to the area
A+B+C+E+F+G, which may be smaller or larger than the actual gains when import/export swaps are fully utilised (i.e.
A+B+C+D+E+F).
11) With reference to Figure A2.2, the measure provided by Hoekman et al. corresponds to the area C+D+H+I+J, which surely may
differ considerably from the “ideal” measures (i.e. A+B+C+D+E+F or B+C+D).
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The customs duties collected by the QUAD
countries on the imports from LDCs amount to
1.1% of total LDC exports and 0.13% of total GDP
in the LDCs (UNCTAD 2000a). Hence, the
removal of import tariffs will not raise incomes
in the LDCs significantly unless there is a
change in the export volumes to the QUAD.
Removal of tarif fs will mean more for some
LDCs than for others. In Canada, 92% of the
customs duties were collected from Asian LDCs
and Bangladesh alone accounted for 77%. We
would expect a similar pattern in the USA as
well as the customs duties in the USA are
related exclusively to the imports of clothing,
and because exports of these products from
Africa are very low. Therefore, if some of the
current tariff revenues are transferred to the
LDCs, the main beneficiary will be Bangladesh.
But even for Bangladesh, the values at stake are
not suf ficiently large to make a major
dif ference. If we assume, for the sake of
illustration, that 80% of the reduced tariff income
accrues to Bangladesh, that would mean an
increase in GDP of 0.4%. Although such an
increase in income certainly would be welcome,
it would not mean a big leap forward for this
country, which has experienced annual grow
rates in real GDP of 4–5% during the period
1990–98 (UNCTAD 2000a). 
In fact, the value of existing customs duties in
the clothing sector is a very good estimate of
the short-term gains of duty-free access. The
reason is that under the Multifibre Agreement,
imports of clothing to the USA and Canada are
restricted by quotas until 2005. The exporters
administer these quotas so that the value of the
quotas accrues to the exporting countries.
Import tariffs in the US and Canada reduce the
market value of the quotas. By removing the
tarif fs, the market value of quotas would
increase by the value of the existing customs
duties. Hence, these duties are good indicators
of the short-term gains of duty-free access. But
for a country like Bangladesh, which has
demonstrated its ability to develop a thriving
export industry, the main benefits of reduced
tariffs will in the long run be more related to the
possibilities of expanding production and export
volumes as competitiveness is improved. 
The overall benefits that can be reaped by LDCs
from higher prices on existing exports to the
QUAD are quite limited. Most of the customs
duties collected by the QUAD on LDC imports
are related to the clothing sector. The
Figure 3.1 QUAD customs duties and imports from LDCs
Sources: OECD (1997), Canadian government, European Commission (2000b), and own calculations.
35
widespread use of quotas in this sector implies
that the value of the customs duties is a
reasonably good estimate of the short-term
gains from duty-free access. 
3.4 Measure II: Benefits from redirecting
existing sales
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the
removal of tariffs and quotas influences neither
the export pattern of the LDCs nor the
consumer prices in the QUAD. We do not want
to stop there, although we realise that further
analysis, due to the lack of data, to a certain
extent will take us into the realm of speculation.
We will certainly not be able to make
predictions about the total gains that can be
reaped through changes in the export pattern.
Our ambition is simply to shed some further
light on the possible magnitude of these gains
by focusing on selected cases that appear to be
of relevance. 
Redirecting existing sales to the QUAD
countries may be accomplished by
• Redirecting existing exports that presently
enter non-QUAD destinations
• Redirecting existing sales to local markets
and satisfying domestic consumption via
imports (import/export swap)
Redirecting exports that currently go to other
destinations will be the easiest way of increasing
exports to the QUAD markets in the short run.
The existence of exports must imply that an
export infrastructure has been established.
Therefore, redirection of exports only requires
that marketing channels are established in the
QUAD markets (if they are not there already)
and that the products satisfy consumer
preferences and sanitary/phytosanitary
requirements in the QUAD. 
The LDCs will have much greater difficulties
diverting sales from their domestic markets to
the QUAD countries. It appears that such trade
swaps are most likely for agricultural food
products, for which only a few LDCs have
established an adequate export infrastructure.
In addition to building physical infrastructure,
the LDCs must organise inspection bodies in
order to ensure compliance with sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations in the importing
countries. They will also have to develop import
infrastructure and internal distribution
networks that can adequately serve domestic
consumers. Finally, considerations about food
supply security may make some countries
reluctant to engage in import/export swaps in
food products on a large scale. 
The purpose of redirecting existing sales is to
take advantage of high domestic prices in
protected QUAD markets relative to the world
market. But one should be aware that this price
margin may decline over time, in particular for
products where LDCs are able to capture a
substantial market share in the QUAD. If
domestic QUAD producers disappear from the
market, the policies that support them are likely
to disappear as well, together with the
favourable price margins. Therefore, beneficial
trade swaps are not likely to be sustainable in
the long run unless the LDCs’ imports continue
to be of marginal importance in the QUAD. 
Table 3.1 provides some illustrative examples of
what LDCs might earn from diverting existing
sales to the QUAD countries. All products
considered face high tariffs in the EU at present.
Most of them are highly protected in the
Japanese market as well, but not in the USA and
Canada. We calculate what the LDCs could
benefit from diverting more of their existing
sales towards the EU market under the
assumption that LDC producers capture the
whole preferential margin. First, we consider
the benefits of redirecting exports that
currently enter non-QUAD markets, and then
we calculate the benefits from diverting 10% of
their existing production (which presently by
and large is used to serve domestic needs). We
emphasise that these numbers are not based on
an assessment of the actual export potential.
That would require detailed analysis at the
product and country level.
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These figures should be interpreted with great
caution. There is however, a clear tendency
wherein the potential gains from a 10%
import/export swap are significantly greater
than the potential gains from redirecting
existing exports. This  is due to the fact that
LDC exports of these products presently are
very low relative to their production levels.
When compared to the value of higher prices on
existing exports to the QUAD (Section 3.3), the
potential gains from import/export swaps also
seem relatively large. 
The probability of import/export swaps is
greater for cereals and sugar than for meat and
dairy products due to more stringent sanitary
and phytosanitary measures for the latter
categories. Thus, the potential for substantial
gains from import/export swaps seems to be
greatest in such products as sugar and rice.
However, there are a number of reasons why we
may have exaggerated the gains in the rice
sector. First, Myanmar, which is excluded from
GSP treatment both in the EU and the USA, is
the main LDC exporter of rice (90% of the total)
and also an important producer (25% of the
total). Moreover, the EU market for rice is too
small to accommodate a 10% import/export
swap; the export increase is almost twice the
size of the EU market. If large quantities of rice
are admitted into the EU market, the price is
likely to fall dramatically, as will the potential
gains for the LDCs. On the other hand, if some
of the export is accommodated by the Japanese
market, which is four times as large as the EU
market, and with current prices exceeding the
world market prices by a factor of five,
substantial gains could still be attained in this
sector.12
The potential gains from redirecting exports of
textiles and clothing are probably limited, in
part because the QUAD share of existing
exports is very large (for clothing) and partly
because consumer preferences differ greatly
between markets. 
Table 3.1 Comparing the potential gains from redirecting exports and 
import/export swaps
Sources: FAO on production and exports, European Commission (2001a) on prices, and GTAP version 4 on export shares to non-
QUAD countries.   
LDC Total LDC Value of Value of 10%
EU price World price production exports redirecting import/export
(USD/t) (USD/t) (1000t) (1000t) existing exports swap
(mill. USD) (mill. USD)
Cereals
Wheat 123 109 7217 124.5 1.7 10.0
Maize 129 85 16335 183.5 6.1 72.4
Rice 554 277 40807 110.7 29.7 1130.2
Sugar 600 231 2056 280.1 10.3 75.9
Fruits/vegetables
Bananas 609 332 5694 20.6 1.8 157.7
Tomatoes 727 584 1176 1.6 0.1 16.7
Meat
Beef meat 2566 1640 2235 5.1 0.9 207.2
Poultry meat 1232 902 886 0.1 0.0 29.3
Sheep meat 3077 1363 1159 14.0 4.3 198.7
Dairy products
Butter 2727 1207 109 1.932 2.9 16.6
Cheese 3231 1989 197 0.019 0.0 24.5
Total these products 58.0 1939.1
12) For other products than rice, LDCs would still have a minor market share in the EU (less than 4% in most categories, except
bananas (16%) and mutton (8%)).
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3.5 Measure III: Increased export revenue
We have yet to take into account the fact that the
removal of tariffs and quotas may increase the
level of production in the LDCs. This may create
additional gains. Note, however, that a dollar
increase in export revenue generated by
increased production has a smaller impact on
GDP than one extra dollar received on existing
exports. The reason is that the gain on existing
exports is a pure price effect, implying that GDP
increases in step with the export revenues,
while gains arising from a production increase
come at a cost, since additional inputs must be
used in order to increase production. A
meaningful comparison between the two
requires that only the value-added component
(i.e. the extra export revenue minus the costs of
inputs) is counted in the case of export
revenues generated by increased production. 
A few studies of the potential increase in LDC
export revenue from improved market access in
the QUAD are available (Ianchovichina et al.
2000, Hoekman et al. 2001, UNCTAD 2000b).
The study by Hoekman et al. comes closest to
our needs, and we will therefore report some of
its results.13
Hoekman et al. study the consequences of
removing all tarif f peaks (defined as tarif fs
above 15%) in the QUAD on imports from LDCs.
Some important shortcomings of their study
are: 1) In cases with tariff-quotas, they use out-
of-quota tariff rates. Since LDCs in many cases
enjoy duty-free access within quotas (e.g. for
several agricultural products in the US and the
EU), this will lead to an overestimation of the
gains. 2) If current exports are zero, the
simulated export level will be zero when tariffs
are reduced as well. Moreover, the model does
not capture potential gains from import/export
swaps. This suggests that gains may be
underestimated. 3) The assumptions about
supply capacity in LDCs are arbitrary.14 4) The
model does not take into account that rules of
origin may prevent LDCs from taking advantage
of preferential access. The latter point is a
crucial one, because most of the gains come in
the clothing sector, where rules of origin are a
significant trade barrier for LDCs (see Section
4.4).  
Hoekman et al. find that if the QUAD countries
eliminate all tariff peaks simultaneously, LDC
export revenue would increase by 11% (i.e. 2.5
billion USD). This is more than 10 times the
current customs duties collected by the QUAD
countries on LDC imports. However, as was
explained above, one cannot compare these
figures without deducting the additional costs of
inputs related to the expansion of production.
The study also shows that the gains for LDCs
would be much larger if the tariff peaks were
eliminated in the US and Canada than in Japan
and the EU. Indeed, the gains from an EU
reform are 
quite modest. Figure 3.2 shows the impact on
LDC export revenue of removing tariff peaks in
each of the QUAD countries (while trade
policies are kept constant in the three other
regions).
13) The main problem with Ianchovichina et al. is that not all LDCs are included, and among the countries which are included,
there are several non-LDCs. Our main problem with the UNCTAD study is that it does not take into account the supply constraints
in the LDCs. 
14) A one percent increase in the export price is assumed to generate a 0.5 percent increase in export volumes for all products and
countries.
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The potential increase in export revenue is
concentrated in a few product categories;
apparel, sugar and tobacco. In the US and
Canada, where the main benefits are to be
reaped, the share of apparel in the total revenue
increase is 66% in the USA and 94% in Canada. In
the US, another 30% of the revenue increase
comes in the tobacco sector. Sugar is the main
benefiting sector in the EU and Japan, reaping
64% of the revenue increase in the EU and 91%
in Japan. 
The gains will also be very unevenly distributed
across LDCs. Exporters of apparel in Asia (e.g.
Bangladesh, Laos, and Cambodia) are the main
beneficiaries.
We believe that the gains in the clothing sector
may be overestimated because exporters of
apparel in Asia, particularly Bangladesh, have
dif ficulties in satisfying rules of origin in a
number of product categories (see the
discussion about rules of origin in Chapter 5).
On the other hand, the gains for certain
agricultural products may be underestimated
because current exports are low or absent due
to high trade barriers.  
3.6 The distribution of gains from
improved market access  
The estimates presented above rest on two
important assumptions that we have not
discussed up to this point, namely that i) the
exporting country receives the full gains from
lower tarif fs and ii) within the exporting
country, the gains will be passed on to
producers of the export goods. In practice
neither of these assumptions may hold. In this
section we will discuss reasons why LDCs may
not be the sole beneficiaries of improved market
access for their goods in the QUAD and why
producers of exports in these countries may not
see the profitability of their activities increase if
preferential margins in the QUAD are
improved. The first issue is important for the
magnitude of the gains to LDCs within existing
levels of production. The second issue is of
interest from a more dynamic perspective; the
degree to which the benefits of improved
market access is passed on to producers will
determine the supply response, which is crucial
to the impact such changes will have on income
levels in the LDCs in the future. Finally, we also
consider how free market access may affect the
incomes earned by other groups than the
producers within the LDCs.
Figure 3.2 Increase in LDC export revenue with unilateral liberalisation (mill. USD)
Sources: Hoekman et al. (2001).
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Whether the LDCs will realise the total potential
benefits from say a reduction in the tariffs levied
on their exports, depends on the market
structure for these products in the QUAD, both
at the wholesale and at the retail level.
Obviously, the markets in the QUAD that LDCs
might supply are structured differently, both
across countries and across products. Both state
trading enterprises (STEs) and multinational
companies (MNCs) are major actors in many
markets for agricultural goods. Neither of these
types of firms discloses many details about their
activities. According to Article XVII of GATT,
which regulates STEs in world trade, member
countries are required to fill in a questionnaire
on the operations of their STEs every three
years.15 However, the degree of compliance with
the rules of notification is poor. In their study of
STEs, Ingco and Ng (1998) found that between
1980 and 1994 only 45 countries submitted
notifications. In fact, during this fifteen-year
period only Finland, Norway and Sweden
provided the complete set of notifications.
Hence, what could be learned about the
activities of STEs across the globe from
studying the notifications was obviously limited.  
The situation is not much better with respect to
private companies. Here, the problem is the fact
that many of the largest agribusinesses are not
publicly traded. Hence, they do not have to
provide shareholders with information which
makes it impossible to gather information about
important variables such as sales, market
shares, and profits. Impressionistic accounts
suggest that some of these companies wield
considerable power in markets for major
agricultural goods. For example, UNCTAD
(1999c, p. 12) provides the following, somewhat
dated, estimates of market share concentration
for some major agricultural commodities:
15) It should be noted that this article is not restricted to firms owned by the government; STEs are defined to include private
companies which have been granted special privileges by the governments of member countries with respect to trade.
Table 3.2 World market shares of major trading companies around 1980
Commodity Market Concentration
Wheat, maize, and soybeans 6 companies account for 85–90%
Coffee 6 companies account for 85–90%
Sugar 4 companies account for 60–65%
Bananas 3 companies account for 80%
Cocoa 3 companies account for 80%
Tea 3 companies account for 85%
Cotton 8 companies account for 85–90%
The fact that companies such as Cargill and
Bunge & Born are among the major traders in
several of these commodities reinforces the
suspicion that competition might be limited,
even though UNCTAD (1999c) suggests that
the figures referred to above might
overestimate the degree of concentration.
Moreover, according to this study the five
largest supermarket chains have a market share
of more than 50% in most European countries,
which indicates that limited competition in
markets for agricultural goods might also be a
problem at the retail level. 
In fact, some of the major MNCs have
operations extending all the way through the
production chain to retailing processed foods
and to consumers. Of course such
diversification might limit the gains that LDCs
could reap. If MNCs are important producers
and exporters in LDCs of goods which LDCs
actually or potentially could supply to the
QUAD, they will be the beneficiaries of
improved market access unless LDC
governments are able to increase the taxation of
their profits accordingly.  
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This stark scenario is probably highly unlikely.
A more realistic concern is that lack of
competition in the import markets might
deprive the LDCs of some of the potential
benefits of duty-free, quota-free access to the
QUAD. Once again, hard numbers and
stringent analyses which could serve as
foundation of a preliminary assessment of the
severity of this problem, are lacking. However,
the study by Morisset (1998) of the
transmission of changes in world market prices
to domestic prices in Canada, Japan, the US and
three major members of the EU (France,
Germany and Italy) indicates that market power
could be important with respect to products
such as rice, sugar and wheat. It is noteworthy
that rice and sugar are among the goods for
which the potential gains from market access
are the largest (cf. Table 3.1). 
Morisset (1998) finds that there is an
asymmetry to the response of domestic prices
to upward and downward movements in world
market prices. Domestic prices in these
countries respond much more strongly to price
increases on world markets than they do to
decreases in world market prices. A noteworthy
example is coffee in the US: between 1975 and
1993, the price of coffee declined by 18% in the
world market while consumers in the US saw an
increase of 240% in the price that they were
being charged. Morisset assesses possible
explanations for such an asymmetric response
and suggests that market power is a likely
culprit. Thus, on the import side there is call for
concern about the degree to which exporting
countries will benefit from improved market
access.
However, even if LDCs capture most of the
gains from higher preferential margins and the
abolishment of quotas, exporters need not see
an increase in the profitability of their activities.
The reason is that the governments might
retain most of the benefits, either through direct
taxation or through the operations of STEs.
Ingco and Ng (1998) have evaluated the
operations of STEs in 45 developing countries
and classified countries according to the
sectoral scope of their STEs and the strength of
their privileges (Table 4, p. 33). Among these
were only three LDCs and only in Uganda were
the STEs involved in export sectors. However,
its regime was classified as weak. Ingco and Ng
(1998) also provide a more detailed account of
the involvement of STEs in the trade of
developing countries in 1990 (Table 5, p. 34). It
is interesting to note the diversity of their
operations in some countries. In Benin, for
example, STEs were involved in the exporting
of dairy products and eggs, fish and fish
preparations, vegetables and fruits, sugar and
honey, beverages, crude fer tilisers and the
residual category of miscellaneous edible
products. However, this tells us little about their
relationship with producers, i.e. whether they
have a domestic monopoly on buying the
output, whether they stabilise producer prices
and, if so, at what level relative to world market
prices, and so on. These issues are clearly of
major importance in determining the strength
of the supply response to increased market
access in the QUAD. However, in general the
supply capacity also depends on other variables
on which we have significantly more
information. This is the subject of Appendix 3. 
Finally, consider what may happen to income
distribution within LDCs when the state does
not tax away the income gains or otherwise
intervene in the product markets. As was
pointed out in Section 3.1, consumers in LDCs
will gain (or at least will be no worse off) from
preferential market access, provided LDC
governments do not put up import controls in
order to limit the use of import/export swaps.
Hence, preferential market access is likely to
benefit both consumers and producers. 
What then about the income distribution
between dif ferent factors of production?
Drawing on standard trade theory, we expect an
increase in the price of a good to increase the
returns to production factors which are used
intensively in the production of the good. Thus,
when we find that exporters of apparel are the
main beneficiaries from an elimination of tariff
peaks in the QUAD (Section 3.5), we would
expect the wages of unskilled labour, which
constitutes the major input into production of
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textiles and clothing, to increase in these
countries. 
The ef fects on income distribution of price
increases for agricultural goods are slightly
more complicated to analyse since we would
need more details on how production is
organised. For example, we would need to know
whether sugar and tobacco plantations use
machinery or labour to harvest the output.
Unfortunately, we do not have the information
needed to assess which factors of production
would benefit in these cases.
Moreover, the consequences of price increases
for returns to land, capital and labour are more
complicated when the markets for inputs are
malfunctioning, which is typically the case in
LDCs. For instance, higher prices for apparel
might reduce unemployment (and under-
employment) instead of increasing wages.
While this would also be a welfare gain, in this
case factory owners, who presumably are
relatively well of f, would benefit from an
increase in profits. Hence, the ef fects of
improved market access on income distribution
in LDCs must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of
this report.
3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has presented three dif ferent
measures of the potential benefits for LDCs of
duty-free access in the QUAD markets. All of
them leave the impression that the potential
gains for the LDCs as a group are indeed
modest, even when measured relative to their
presently low levels of income. The main
reasons are that (1) most LDCs already enjoy
quite liberal market access in important export
markets, and (2) the ability of LDCs to take
advantage of trade preferences is limited, due to
supply capacity constraints. Moreover, the
market power of firms in importing countries
may imply that the potential benefits are not
realised. 
Nevertheless, there are significant benefits to
be reaped for certain countries and in certain
product groups. In particular, Asian LDCs may
gain from improved access for apparel in the US
and Canadian markets. 
As for the agricultural sector, there is not much
evidence in our analysis pointing to increased
revenue on existing exports or to increasing
production volumes. The former is due to very
limited exports of protected products at present,
and the latter is due to supply constraints,
widely interpreted. However, we have identified
potential, though extremely uncertain, gains
from engaging in import/export swaps for some
agricultural products, such as sugar and rice.
The same can be said about meat exports,
although the LDCs in this case have a much
longer way to go in order to fulfil quality
standards in the importing countries.
The fact that the benefits of duty-free and quota-
free access are concentrated on a few product
categories demonstrates the importance of
extending free market access to all products. A
clause about liberalisation of “essentially all”
products will most likely reduce the benefits for
LDCs substantially because the importing
countries then typically will retain import
controls in those categories where the benefits
for LDCs can be reaped.  
No doubt, the analysis suf fers from several
shortcomings. The most critical one is perhaps
that the relationship between higher export
prices and future supply capacities in LDCs is
poorly understood. If higher export prices lead
to the adoption of more productive technologies
and to investment in infrastructure, the gains
from duty-free and quota-free access may
certainly increase substantially. Our inquiry into
the present supply capacities in LDCs and what
it would take to bring the capacities onto levels
that could boost export volumes, leaves
however, the sad impression that they have a
long and difficult path ahead (see Appendix 3).
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This chapter discusses how preferential trade
arrangements should be designed in order to
serve the interests of the LDCs to the greatest
extent possible. Our focus is on the following
subjects:
• Binding of tariffs and procedures
• Safeguards
• Graduation
• Rules of origin
4.1 Binding of tariffs and procedures
4.1.1 Benefits of binding
Since GSP preferences are given on a unilateral
and non-contractual basis, they can in principle
be withdrawn at any point in time, both sector-
wise and country-wise. Considerable
uncertainty is therefore attached to future GSP
preferences. Many LDCs are concerned that
this uncertainty is limiting the impact of
preferential trade arrangements on their
economic development. 
This uncertainty would be reduced if
preferential tarif fs were bound in the WTO.
Countries that want to increase tarif fs above
bound rates have to go through a costly process
in the WTO, including multilateral consultations
where they need to defend their position based
on a set of agreed upon criteria. They also have
to offer compensation to the offended parties,
and if the parties involved do not find a solution,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure can be
applied. Hence, the costs of withdrawing bound
preferences would be much greater than the
costs of withdrawing the current GSP
preferences. 
In this section we discuss to which extent
binding of preferences would favour the LDCs
and how one may proceed to reduce the
uncertainty attached to preferential trade
arrangements. Although we consider binding of
tariff preferences to be in the interests of LDCs,
the benefits could easily be overstated. 
The argument for binding preferences is
straightforward. Due to limited supply capacity,
most LDCs have not been able to take full
advantage of the preferences they have been
offered. Supply capacity can only be enhanced
through investments in infrastructure,
education, machinery, etc., but such
investments are hampered by uncertainty.
Binding preferences would provide LDCs with
more predictable trade relations and thus
stimulate export growth. All recent market
access initiatives, such as the EBA, lack this
kind of predictability since they are provided
within the GSP framework.
Not all LDCs seem to put the same emphasis on
binding preferences. Our impression is that
binding is more heavily emphasised by African
LDCs than by the Asian LDCs. This may reflect
that African countries have had the greatest
problems with providing stable and predictable
business environments for the export sector. 
The effect of binding preferences should not be
overstated. First, binding preferential tariff rates
for LDCs cannot eliminate uncertainty about
preferential margins, i.e. the difference between
MFN tariffs and LDC preferential rates. As long
as the future development of MFN tariff rates is
uncertain, so will be the preferential margin.
Duty-free access is probably of little value for
the LDCs unless preferential margins vis-à-vis
other exports are maintained, as is clearly
demonstrated by Hoekman et al. (2001). Note
also that if the LDCs are able to successfully
penetrate export markets in areas with high
preference margins, that may accelerate the
reduction of MFN tariffs because the arguments
for maintaining high tarif fs will dwindle as
domestic producers lose market shares. 
Secondly, what matters for the investment
climate is the total level of uncertainty, which in
addition to uncertainty about trade preferences
includes political uncertainty, uncertainty about
domestic economic policies, etc. In many LDCs,
major uncertainties are related to factors other
4 How Can the Gains be Secured?
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than the trade preferences (cf. Appendix 3).
Stable trade preferences would therefore not
necessarily make a big difference. 
Several of the preference-granting countries
argue that the issue of binding is over-
emphasised by the developing countries
because there is no evidence that preferences
towards LDCs have been withdrawn.16 We do
not believe that the LDCs should be convinced
by this argument because preferences have
traditionally been granted either for products
that are not particularly sensitive or to countries
that do not have sufficient supply capacity to
make use of the preferences. Past experience
can therefore not be used to predict what will
happen in the case of more radical liberalisation.
On the other hand, governments that withdraw
LDCs’ preferences will probably do so at a
political cost because such actions will conflict
with of ficial development policies. Devel-
opment-oriented NGOs that monitor the
implementation of duty-free access could play
an important role in this context. 
4.1.2 How can preferences be made more binding?
There are a number of ways in which current
trade preferences for LDCs could be made more
binding and thus more predictable. In addition
to binding within the WTO, more binding
contracts could be entered into between the
LDCs and the preference granting countries,
and domestic legislation could be used in
developed countries to make trade preferences
more secure. These arrangements could
include not only a greater degree of tariff and
quota bindings, but also more binding rules
about safeguards, rules of origin, graduation
and other procedural issues. 
Unilateral/bilateral approaches:
• Make current GSP schemes subject to all
WTO disciplines.
The simplest thing to do in order to
increase predictability for LDCs would be
for each of the preference granting
countries to notify the WTO that their GSP
schemes should be considered as binding
within the WTO framework. This implies,
inter alia, that preferential tarif f rates
cannot be changed without compensating
the LDCs and that the WTO dispute
settlement procedure will be activated
should a dispute arise. This would provide
substantial improvement in the degree of
predictability for LDCs. If the preference-
granting countries really intend to provide
secure access for LDCs within their current
GSP schemes, such notifications should be
executed immediately. If not, the LDCs may
have a legitimate concern about the
predictability of current preference
schemes. 
• Convert current GSP schemes into formal
contracts with the LDCs. 
A formal contract is more binding than
unilateral concessions if the contract is
enforceable. Although international
agreements may be dif ficult to enforce
through formal procedures, there is little
doubt that written agreements may have a
significant impact on government
behaviour. Building provisions about
compensation into the contract could
probably further enhance the likelihood of
compliance. 
• Bind preferences in domestic legislation.
In several countries, the government has
considerable discretionary power to change
the GSP scheme. By defining procedures
that increase the difficulty of making such
changes, the degree of predictability might
be enhanced. The US case of prohibiting
GSP treatment of textiles by law is a
negative example of how domestic legisla-
tion can be used to increase predictability.
This approach would, however, offer far less
security than the others mentioned above.  
Plurilateral approaches:
• Plurilateral agreements between selected
developed countries and the LDCs.
Agreements that encompass several
developed countries are preferable over
16) There are, however, examples that the benefits of preferential arrangements have been suspended by the use of safeguards 
(cf. the Norwegian ceiling on beef imports). 
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unilateral ones since they typically involve a
greater degree of commitment, in part
because such agreements tend to attract
greater public attention. Such agreements
could entail provisions on all levels, from
agreements about procedures to be
followed in preferential trade agreements,
via common rules of origin and rules about
safeguards, to lists of tariffs and quotas that
the parties are committed to. The credibility
of such contracts would be considerably
enhanced if the contracting parties made
the agreement subject to WTO disciplines,
following the practice of other plurilateral
agreements under the auspices of the WTO.
Multilateral approaches through the WTO:
Multilateral solutions through the WTO require
a consensus agreement among all WTO
members.   
• Binding of preferential tarif fs in the WTO
through a waiver.
Binding preferences in the WTO would
entail the application of all other WTO
disciplines and would therefore imply a
high degree of stability and predictability.
Besides the possibility of unilateral
notification of GSP schemes, preferences
may be bound in the WTO through
multilateral approaches, for instance by
agreeing on a waiver to the MFN principle
in the pattern of the Enabling Clause.  
• Binding of preferential tarif fs in the WTO
through amendments of Articles I and II.
Another way around this is to amend
Articles I and II of the GATT agreement,
which lay down the principles of MFN
treatment. This will be a very demanding
task, not only because countries will be
unwilling to open negotiations on this very
issue alone, but also because one would
then have to discuss the very cornerstone
of the entire international trading system. 
• Ministerial Declarations by WTO member
states.
Ministers may agree on principles that
should govern the trading relations
between LDCs and other WTO members.
Although these principles will not be
binding unless they are included in the
WTO framework, they may function as an
important political signal to the member
states. A Ministerial Declaration is easier to
achieve than bindings in the WTO because
a lower degree of commitment may induce
more countries to sign a Ministerial
Declaration. 
Binding in itself is of no value unless what is
bound makes a difference for the LDCs. The
following sections therefore discuss which trade
rules favour the LDCs. We start by discussing
the safeguard issue and then proceed with a
discussion on principles relating to rules of
origin.
4.2 Safeguards
Safeguards are those measures that may be
invoked by an importing country to protect
against imports that represent a threat or do
actual harm to the domestic economy or
domestic industries. The use of safeguards is
regulated in the WTO through the Agreement
on Safeguard Measures (ASM) (see Box 4.1).
This agreement does not, however, apply to
preferential trade arrangements such as the
GSP. Some countries have included special
safeguard clauses in their GSP schemes, while
others have not (see Section 4.2.3). 
The aim of this section is to define principles for
the use of safeguards within preferential trade
arrangements that are in the interest of LDCs.
The ASM is used as a point of departure, since
these rules offer stronger protection of export
country interests than any other fully developed
safeguard regulation.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the
restrictiveness of the ASM may have led
countries to turn to other measures instead,
such as antidumping duties. Recently,
antidumping duties have increasingly been used
by developing countries against other
developing countries. However, the threat of
antidumping measures normally should not be a
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major problem for the LDCs. It will rarely be
profitable for LDCs to engage in regular
dumping, mainly because they have extremely
weak home markets. However, it might be
profitable to charge different prices in different
export markets. There have been examples that
such discrimination has provoked antidumping
measures. From an LDC point of view, it is
essential that such pricing policies cannot justify
antidumping actions. 
4.2.1 Safeguards and market access 
Including safeguards in trade agreements may
at first glance be seen as a way of diluting the
value of the agreements. But this interpretation
is too narrow. Of course, if tariffs were bound at
zero rates, the LDCs would prefer that the
possibility of employing safeguards did not
exist. The problem is, however, that duty-free
access would be much harder to achieve in the
first place without leaving a line of retreat open
to the importing countries. Safeguards
therefore play an important role in the
liberalisation of trade. This may be particularly
important in the case of preferential access
because such arrangements lack the reciprocity
that is such an important driving factor behind
multilateral trade liberalisations. 
What matters for the LDCs at the end of the day
is the real level of protection, i.e. the combined
effect of tariffs, safeguards, rules of origin etc.
Since there is a trade-off between tariffs and
safeguards in the sense that one cannot get rid
of both at the same time, one should ask which
of them should be dismantled first from an LDC
point of view. 
Although we have not asked LDC repre-
sentatives this question, there is reason to
believe that they typically will have most to gain
by concentrating their efforts on the removal of
tarif fs. Trade liberalisation always involves
uncertainty about how severely domestic
industries will be hit by foreign competition.
History shows that vulnerable domestic
industries have considerable influence on trade
policies. This is certainly also the case in those
sectors that are of importance to LDCs (e.g.
agriculture and textiles/clothing). If safeguards
are not available, these sectors will probably use
the uncertainty as an argument to keep tariffs at
higher levels than are needed in order to ensure
adequate protection. By using safeguards,
protective trade measures will be invoked only
in those cases where imports actually pose a
threat or actually damage domestic industries,
and not in those cases where the potential threat
never develops.    
In the following, we will discuss which
principles for safeguard measures in
preferential trade arrangements should be
adhered to in order to favour LDC interests.
This discussion will have particular relevance if
preferential tariffs are bound in the WTO, in
which case one may consider negotiating a
separate safeguard agreement for preferential
trade. When it comes to unilateral and
autonomous preferences, such as the current
GSP schemes, safeguard measures play a
somewhat different role. Formally, there is no
need for safeguard measures in the GSP
systems to protect national interests because
preferences can be withdrawn at any time.
There are, however, political costs involved,
implying that it will normally be easier to
suspend preferences by referring to explicit
safeguard rules that have been established in
advance. In reality, safeguard measures therefore
serve similar purposes in the preference systems
as in the case of bound tariffs.
4.2.2 Safeguards that favour LDC interests
At the fundamental level, safeguards favour
LDC interests when 1) the possibility of using
safeguards leads to increased market access for
LDC (i.e. lower tariffs and quotas), and 2) the
safeguards achieve their objectives for the
importing country at the smallest possible cost
for the LDCs. We shall assume that the first
criterion is fulfilled. From the second criterion,
we have derived a list of more specific
principles. 
Safeguards should
• Address a well-defined, serious injury in
the importing country 
46
• Be based on a clear and restrictive
definition of serious injury
• Not be applied without a proven, causal link
between LDC imports and the injury
• Specify generous limits for LDC market
shares and LDC import growth below
which the LDCs will not be targeted by
safeguards
• Not limit the overall size of the market more
than necessary
• Not prevent LDCs from capturing market
shares from other exporters
• Not be implemented without compensation
to the LDCs
While the first four principles deal with the
question of when safeguards are to be applied,
the three last ones deal with the question of
which measures should be implemented. 
A well-defined and serious injury
Safeguards should address a well-defined and
serious injury in the importing country. Imports
in themselves can hardly represent a problem
for any country. An injury will therefore not
arise unless imports cause adjustment problems
in the domestic economy. Safeguard rules
should specify a list of the variables that are of
such importance to the importing country that
rapid adjustments may qualify as a serious
injury. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards
includes a long list of such variables, such as the
level of production and sales, productivity,
profits and employment (see Box 4.1). It is far
from obvious that all these variables should
qualify as potential serious injury in the context
of LDC imports. Can a loss in sales ever be
classified as serious injury if profits and
employment are maintained at reasonable
levels? Another example of a dubious injury
variable is the price-criterion used in the WTO
agreement on safeguards in the agricultural
sector. 
Box 4.1 Safeguards in WTO agreements
A WTO member may restrict imports of a product temporarily if its domestic industry is injured or threatened with
serious injury caused by a surge in imports. The Agreement on Safeguards (ASM) in the WTO sets out strict
requirements for safeguard actions.
The ASM sets out criteria for assessing whether “serious injury” is being caused or threatened, and the factors which
must be considered in determining the impact of imports on the domestic industry. By the domestic industry one
means the total group of producers of like or directly competitive products. An import surge justifying safeguard
action can be a real increase in imports (an absolute increase) or an increase in the market share of imports (relative
increase). The latter need not imply the former as changes in market shares depend on both changes in import
quantity and in the size of the total market. Other relevant factors are the share of the domestic market taken by
increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilisation, profits and losses and
employment. The existence of a causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or
threat thereof has to be documented. When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic
industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports.
Safeguard investigations by national authorities should be transparent, follow established rules and practices and avoid
arbitrary methods. The authorities conducting investigations have to announce publicly when hearings are to take
place and provide other appropriate means for interested parties to present evidence. The evidence must include
arguments on whether a measure is in the public interest.
When imposed, a safeguard measure should be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious
injury and to help the industry concerned to adjust. Where quantitative restrictions (quotas) are imposed, they normally
should not reduce the quantities of imports below the annual average for the last three representative years for which
statistics are available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious
injury. According to ASM, a safeguard measure should not last more than four years, but can be extended to eight years
if the measure is needed and there is evidence that the industry is adjusting.
Safeguards cannot be applied towards developing countries whose market share is below 3% of total imports,
provided that the combined market shares of developing countries do not exceed 9%.
There are special safeguard rules in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which apply in the trade in agricultural
products. These rules put far less restrictions on the use of safeguards than does the ASM.
Source: World Trade Organisation
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Most countries consider that adjustments
leading to a significant reduction in employment
represent a welfare problem. This is therefore
an example of a variable that probably should be
included in the list of potential injuries.
From an LDC point of view it is also important
that “safeguards” are not used as a means to
address domestic issues in LDC countries. This
relates to the current debate on the use of trade
measures to promote labour standards in
developing countries. Several countries have
included such provisions in their GSP systems.
One reason for this is that competition from
producers with low labour standards is said to
be “unfair”, implying that one should have the
possibility to “safeguard” domestic producers.
We will not enter into a discussion on whether
importing countries have a right to do so, but we
want to underscore that conditions of this kind
have nothing to do with safeguard mechanisms.
They are rather types of conditionalities
proposed by importing countries to influence
the domestic policies of exporting countries. We
know that developing countries have been quite
critical of including a social clause in the WTO.
Neither do they have any interests in including
a social clause in preferential trade
arrangements. 
A clear and restrictive definition of serious injury
The application of safeguard measures should
be based on a clear and restrictive definition of
serious injury. For example, if the relevant
variable is changes in employment, the
safeguard rules should specify, or at least
indicate, the rate of change that is required in
order to qualify as a serious injury. Such clarity
is important in order to increase the predict-
ability of the trading regime. Restrictiveness is
important in order to ensure that one strikes a
fair balance between the export interests of
LDCs and the concerns of the far more
developed importing countries. 
On way of ensuring a restrictive definition of
serious injury is to require that the interests of
the users of imported products are taken into
account during the safeguard investigations.
When the interests of consumers and firms
using imports as intermediates are counted, the
application of safeguard measures tend to be
reduced (Finger 1998).17 This is one important
reason for the reduction in the application of
antidumping measures by the EU and the USA
in recent years. 
A restrictive definition of serious injury can also
be ensured by requiring that the relevant
market is widely defined. Within the WTO
framework, the relevant market is usually
defined by terms such as “like products” or
“directly competitive products”. Both these
terms are vague and need to be interpreted. A
wide interpretation would generally favour LDC
interests, because it would reduce the
probability that a serious injury arises within the
defined market. “Competitive products” will
typically represent a wider definition of the
market than “like products” and is therefore
preferable. A problem with this criterion is,
however, that it is not very transparent and
predictable. A possible solution might be to
define “competitive products” through direct
reference to tariff classifications. 
Clarity is important in order to minimise
lobbying (Hoekman and Leidy 1993). Indicators
of injury such as employment, profits, utilisation
of capacity, productivity and prices can be
manipulated by the firms. If a firm knows in
advance that a reduction in employment can
lead to more protection in the future, it has
incentives to reduce employment to obtain
protection. The presence of safeguards also
provides incentives to blame imports for any
injury or adjustment problem.
Hoekman and Leidy (1993) therefore argue that
impor t penetration is the only acceptable
criterion. It is least susceptible to strategic
behaviour and is directly tied to the presumed
source of difficulty. However, we disagree on
this. Imports are a problem only insofar as they
create domestic adjustment problems. We will
therefore contend that it is a better solution for
17) See also Jackson (1993) for a discussion of the justification of the use of import restraints for safeguard purposes.
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LDCs that the criteria that may trigger
safeguard measures are linked directly to the
real injuries (e.g. reduced employment) and
leave it to the importing countries to prove a
causal link between the injury and LDC
imports. 
A proven, causal link with LDC imports
Safeguards should not be applied without a
proven, causal link between LDC imports and
the injury. A similar principle is included in the
ASM, but our principle goes further by
requiring that the causal link is not only with
imports in general but with imports from LDCs.
It may be the case that an increase in imports
may come partly from LDCs and partly from
other countries. From the LDCs’ point of view, it
is then important that safeguards against LDC
imports under preferential agreements are not
justified unless the import increase from LDCs
alone would be sufficient to cause serious injury.
Such a rule would clearly discriminate against
other import sources, but that is indeed the
purpose of preferential trading rules.     
Generous lower limits for LDC market shares and
import growth
Safeguards should specify generous limits for
LDC market shares and LDC import growth
below which LDCs will not be targeted by
safeguards. Since LDCs have very small market
shares in most markets, even a large increase in
LDC exports will have a negligible impact on
the importing countries. Establishing rules that
prohibit the use of safeguards against small
suppliers would therefore provide considerably
greater predictability for the LDCs at a low cost
for the importing countries. 
The ASM includes rules of this kind; safeguards
cannot be imposed against a developing country
if the country is supplying less than 3% of the
imports of the product, except when the
combined market share of the developing
countries exceeds 9% of the market. 
An alternative to restrictions related to market
shares could be to connect them to import
growth, guaranteeing that safeguards are not
imposed if import growth does not exceed a
certain limit. From an LDC point of view, a
combination of criteria related to market share
and import growth would clearly be preferable.
Thus, exporting countries that are not yet
established in the market could enjoy significant
import growth sheltered by the market share
rule, while exporting countries that are well-
established and already have a market share
close to the limit (e.g. 3%) can be sheltered by
the import growth rule. This should not
represent a problem for the importing country
since any adjustments will occur gradually. 
We have also considered whether the 3% rule
applied in the ASM would be suf ficiently
generous from an LDC point of view. The
answer is probably yes in most cases, but
certainly not always, as is clearly demonstrated
by the following example: 
In 1999, the import shares of clothing from
Bangladesh in Canada, the US and the EU were
2.6%, 3.1% and 2.3%, respectively (WTO 2001).
Bangladesh was thus close to –   or above –   the
3% limit in all these markets. When we look at a
more disaggregated level of product categories,
the picture becomes even more worrying. Table
4.1 reports the market shares for Bangladesh in
the 11 most important product categories in the
US market, representing approximately 65% of
its exports of clothing to the US. In only two of
these categories is the import share below 3%.
This shows that the 3% rule is not sufficiently
generous for all LDCs. 
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Not limiting the market size more than necessary
Safeguard measures should not limit the overall
size of the market more than necessary. 
A general principle from economic theory is
that policy instruments should be targeted as
directly as possible at the problem they are
intented to address. This implies for instance
that if the government’s primary concern is
unemployment and adjustment problems, it will
be more ef ficient to use (labour) subsidies
rather than tariffs or quotas. 
In principle, subsidies would also be better than
trade measures from the LDCs’ perspective.
While both measures reduce the price received
by exporters, subsidies will increase total
demand since the consumer price in the
importing country is reduced. The overall
market size is therefore enhanced by subsidies.
Tariffs have the opposite effect; by increasing
the consumer price in the importing country,
total demand is reduced. 
From the importing country’s point of view, the
important issue is to maintain a given level of
employment. If safeguard measures contribute
to larger total demand, this objective can be
accomplished at lower costs for LDC exporters
than if total demand is reduced. 
There are also problems related to the use of
subsidies, of course. Subsidies involve financial
costs for the importing country, and they may
be quite easy to manipulate for purely
protectionist purposes. Such consideration must
be weighed against the benefits for LDCs of
having access to a larger market. 
Allowing LDCs to capture market shares from other
exporters
Safeguard measures should be implemented in
way that allows LDCs to capture market shares
from other exporters. From the importing
country’s point of view, the important issue is to
reduce the total imports to a tolerable level. This
can be achieved without harming LDCs if the
safeguards discriminate against non-LDC
exporters. 
Consider a situation where preferential market
access for LDCs has caused a surge in the
imports from these countries at the same time
as imports from non-LDCs also attain a
considerable level. Assume that safeguards are
then warranted with reference to a special
safeguards agreement for LDCs in the WTO.
From the LDCs’ point of view, it will then be
important that any quotas are not limited to
LDCs alone, even if they are the source of the
problem. By imposing quotas on non-LDC
exporters as well, for instance in proportion to
past levels of imports, the LDCs might be able
to capture market shares from other exporters. 
Table 4.1 US imports of clothing from Bangladesh, year ending 11/2000
Category 1000 USD Share of imports (%)
Total MFA imports 2 193 781 3.06
340 Non-knit shirts, men 239 643 9.8
359 Other cotton apparel 214 949 18.0
347 Cotton men/boys trousers 176 176 3.5
341 Women/girls non-knit blouse 151 319 11.9
659 Other apparel 148 641 7.2
352 Cotton underwear 84 929 3.4
634 Other coats, men 83 491 6.6
348 Women/girls slacks 78 459 1.6
239 Baby garments 74 054 4.2
647 Trousers, men 73 717 4.2
338 Knit shirts 70 962 1.5
Sources: Otexa (2000).
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Note also that the principle of allocating quotas
according to past performance is too
conservative from an LDC point of view, since it
tends to discriminate against potential new
entrants that previously did not have the
capacity to export.      
Compensating the Least Developed Countries
Safeguards against imports from LDCs should
not be implemented without compensation. 
The ASM says that when safeguards are
applied, an exporting country can seek
compensation (through lower tariffs on other
products) through consultations. If no
agreement is reached, the exporting country
can retaliate by raising tariffs on imports from
the country that has implemented safeguards.
By providing compensation, the importer’s costs
of implementing safeguard measures increase.
When the costs of protection increase, it is less
likely that protection is implemented in the first
place.
One common characteristic of LDCs is the high
export concentration ratios (see UNCTAD
1999e). A high concentration ratio makes it
more difficult for importing countries to find
other markets/products where they can
compensate (by lowering tarif fs and/or
increasing imports) since the country in
question normally trades few products and, as
shown in Chapter 2, most LDC exports are
already duty free. In the event that
compensation is not provided, LDCs lack
resources to retaliate. Thus other compensation
mechanisms than those in the ASM need to be
developed. At any rate, it should be clear that if
no compensation can be provided, safeguard
measures should not be applied. Safeguards
should also be applied for a temporary period
only and be progressively liberalised in order to
reduce inefficiencies. By defining a clear cut off
point for the use of safeguards, the incentives
for domestic adjustment in the importing
country increase. 
In order to ensure compensation, it is also
important that all available safeguard measures,
as well as “safeguard substitutes”, are
encompassed by the same compensation
requirement. Otherwise, importing countries
would be tempted to substitute cheaper
measures for the more expensive ones (cf. the
previous discussion on the use of antidumping
measures rather than the standard safeguard
clause). 
4.2.3 Safeguards applied by QUAD in their GSP
systems
Most countries have included safeguards in
their GSP systems. But since it is relatively easy
to withdraw preferences altogether, the rules
are usually not developed in great detail or with
a high level of precision. This section provides a
brief description of some of the safeguards in
the QUAD GSP systems. Two points are made.
First, the present rules do not conform
particularly well with the principles set out in
the previous section. Secondly, in order to bind
preferential tariffs, the safeguard measures in
the GSP systems will need considerable
revision. 
Canada’s GSP rules explicitly refer to the
multilateral safeguards in GATT 1994. Canada
will thus take emergency action in respect of
products that are imported in such quantities
and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive products
by withdrawing or modifying its preferential
concession. If there is an injury and the removal
of GSP concessions will remove the injury, a
public inquiry will be conducted, and the
Government may withdraw the GSP concession
or establish tariff rate quotas.
The European Union has a special safeguard
mechanism in its GSP system. The criteria are
whether an imported product “causes or
threatens to cause serious dif ficulties to a
Community producer of like or directly
competing products”. 
The definition of the market is narrow as it
refers to directly competing products, while the
requirement of serious dif ficulties is weaker
than for instance serious injury required by the
ASM. One does not need to prove that imports
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have caused or threaten to cause a serious
injury; one need only examine the possible
existence of serious dif ficulties. In such an
examination a very broad range of variables are
to be taken into account:
• Reduction in market shares of Community
producers
• Reduction in their production
• Increases in their stocks
• Closure of their production capacity or low





The EBA also includes a temporary safeguard
(anti-fraud) measure that can be applied in the
case of massive increases in imports in relation to
the exporters’ usual levels of production and
expor t capacity. For imports of particularly
sensitive products causing serious disturbance
to the Community markets and their regulatory
mechanism, the commission may suspend the
preferences.
Neither the US nor the Japanese GSP systems
have particular safeguards against LDCs. In the
US GSP system, preferential treatment of non-
LDCs can be withdrawn when a particular
country has a certain amount of imports (cf. the
rules on “competitive needs”). These rules do
not apply to the LDCs, although the limit was by
far exceeded for certain LDC products. The
reason for this is most likely that the industrial
products that are of particular interest for the
developing countries (such as textiles, clothing,
footwear and electronic articles) do not benefit
from GSP preferences in the US and thereby do
not pose a real threat. If LDCs are provided with
free market access in textiles and clothing, this
might change. This point is underscored by the
Trade and Development Act, which provides
preferential treatment to Sub-Saharan and
Caribbean exports of clothing. The act includes
provisions on safeguards in the case of a “surge
of imports which is damaging or threatening the
US industry”.
Safeguards in Japan’s GSP system are mainly
based on ceilings, but the LDCs are exempted
from these regulations. 
4.3 Graduation
Preferential market access that is provided
under conditions relating to low income levels,
such as the LDC initiatives, contains an inherent
disincentive to utilise the preferences because
preferences may be lost if the country utilises
the system successfully. For the LDCs,
graduation would mean that trade preferences
would be significantly reduced. But they would
not disappear entirely, since the LDCs would be
eligible for normal GSP treatment even after
graduation. 
The main argument for including a rule about
graduation in preferential trade arrangements is
that this makes it easier to target the benefits of
the trade preferences towards those countries
that are most needy. 
4.3.1 The disincentive implied by graduation
The possibility of graduation does not seem to
pose a major disincentive for the LDCs at
present because most LDCs are very far away
from fulfilling the graduation criteria. 
GDP per capita is the main criterion used to
determine whether a country should be
included in the UN list of LDCs. Moreover,
indices of physical quality of life and economic
vulnerability are used. In order to be included in
the list, GDP per capita must be below 900 USD.
The graduation limit is 1035 USD (UN 2000). 
Most LDCs have a long way to go to meet the
criteria for graduation. UNCTAD (2000a) has
calculated how long it will take to reach 900
USD per capita (which was the graduation limit
before the last review) if the real growth rates of
the 1990s persist. The results are shown in
Table 4.2. Except for those countries that are
already there, only Lesotho will reach the
threshold by the end of 2015. Unless growth
rates increase substantially, the graduation
question will not become an urgent issue for a
very long time.
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Botswana graduated from the UN list in 1994. A
superficial investigation of the export levels and
trends in Botswana during the 1990s reveals no
indication of weaker export performance after
graduation. This is true also when we filter out
the exports of diamonds, copper, nickel, and
soda ash (which typically face zero MFN
tarif fs), and beef (for which Botswana has
retained its export quotas in the EU).18 A more
thorough analysis is needed, however, to
determine the real impact of graduation on
Botswana’s export performance.    
4.3.2 Graduation principles
How should graduation rules and procedures be
designed to serve the interests of LDCs?
Dif ferent answers to this question will be
obtained depending on whether we ask the
country that is supposed to graduate or the
countries that are still far away from the
graduation limit. The latter group would prefer
immediate graduation, without any transition
periods, if that would benefit their own export
interests. In most cases, though, it seems
unlikely that the graduation of a single LDC
would have a great impact on the other
countries in the group. Let us therefore
concentrate on the interests of the country that
is graduating. 
It is of course possible to decide that countries
that graduate from the UN list should still retain
their LDC trade preferences.19 The main reason
why it would be dif ficult to defend such a
procedure as a general principle is consider-
ations about horizontal equity; a situation might
arise where two countries at the same level of
development are treated dif ferently because
only one of them is a former LDC. Some rules
on graduation therefore seem inescapable. 
Given that graduation limits must be defined, it
is important for the graduating country that the
rules and procedures do not unnecessarily
weaken the prospects for economic growth or
create abrupt structural changes in the

















































Table 4.2 How long will the LDCs take to reach $900 per capita income levels if current
trends persist?
18) We thank Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås for making the data available on which our calculations are based.
19) Norway has followed this route in the case of Botswana. 
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Allow for a reasonable transition period after
graduation 
Businesses that anticipate changes in their
export opportunities will take action in advance
to reduce the costs of structural change. It is
therefore of utmost importance that businesses
have accurate information about when trade
preferences will be removed. Without such
information, they may start the readjustment
processes too early or too late, thus imposing
unnecessary costs on the domestic economy.  
It is difficult to predict exactly when a country
will graduate from the UN list. Although the
formal criteria are reasonably transparent, the
criteria tend to change somewhat over time, and
separate judgements are occasionally made that
may postpone the decision about graduation.
The point in time of graduation is therefore
unpredictable. In order to eliminate this
uncertainty, the graduating country should
retain its trade preferences for a well-defined
period of time after graduation from the UN list.
The transition period should be long enough to
allow structural adjustments in the graduating
country to take place at minimal costs. In
practice, this means that the transition period
should last at least until fixed investments are
fully depreciated, which in many cases may
imply transition periods of 10–20 years. 
Of course, during the transition period, a
situation might arise where similar countries
are treated dif ferently. But as long as the
transition period is well-defined and justified by
the economic arguments presented above, the
equity-arguments will not have the same force
as when trade preferences are extended to
previous LDCs for an indefinite period of time. 
Do not increase import restrictions gradually during
the transition period
To obtain a smooth transition in the graduating
country, it might appear to be preferable to
tighten import restrictions gradually. But if such
a gradual adjustment is beneficial, it may be
accomplished by the graduating country itself
through export restraints. The preference-
granting countries should therefore wait until
the end of the transition period before
implementing any import restrictions. 
Do not allow for sectoral graduation
The GSP systems of several countries contain
rules about sector wise graduation (e.g. the
USA and the EU). Such rules may be extremely
damaging for many LDCs because their exports
are typically concentrated on a few products. As
shown in Section 3.5, improved market access in
the QUAD would typically stimulate LDCs’
exports significantly in only a few product
categories. If graduation can be applied in
specific sectors, the potential gains from duty-
free and quota-free access might therefore be
significantly reduced. It is thus of utmost
importance that sectoral graduation rules cannot
be applied against LDCs. 
At present, sector-wise graduation is not a big
problem for the LDC. In the US, LDCs are
exempted from sector-wise graduation. In the
EU, LDCs might in principle be hurt by sector-
wise graduation, but the rules are designed in
such a way that this will not occur in practice.
The EU is currently in the process of explicitly
stating an exemption for LDC graduation in
their GSP regulation.20
4.4 Rules of origin 
According to the mandate, this study is
supposed to take the present rules of origin as
given, at least in the short run. As was pointed
out in Section 3, rules of origin may severely
limit the benefits that LDCs can reap for duty-
and quota-free access. Hoekman et al. (2001)
have shown that most of the potential gains
from duty-free access accrue in the clothing
sector. However, a considerable share of this
potential cannot be realised under the present
rules of origin. 
All preferential trade arrangements must
specify what is needed for a product to confer
origin in a country that is eligible for
preferential treatment. Even though the rules of
20) Source: Wolfgang Plasa, Head of the GSP section, European Commission.
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origin restrict the opportunities of LDCs to take
advantage of preferential market access, these
rules cannot be regarded as a barrier to trade
since they are a precondition for granting
preferential access in the first place.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the importers may
use the rules of origin as a trade barrier by
making the rules unduly complex or restrictive,
exactly what the LDCs claim the industrialised
countries have done by employing rules of
origin that are unreasonably restrictive and by
not harmonising the rules across product
groups and across countries. 
Harmonisation of rules of origin (ROO) in the
GSP systems would reduce the information
requirements and therefore the costs of utilising
the GSP system. A reduction in costs would
probably increase the utilisation rates (see
below). 
The importance of harmonisation is further
underscored by the lack of harmonisation
between non-preferential ROO and preferential
ROO and the fact that a country may face
dif ferent sets of rules of origin in dif ferent
preferential arrangements. For instance, in the
beginning of the 1990s, the United States had
six dif ferent sets of preferential origin, the
European Community had fourteen, while
Canada had six (Vermulst 1994, 435). Such a
system lacks predictability because it is based on
“a case-by-case approach”. There is also a
tendency to have more liberal rules of origin for
countries with closer political or economic ties.
The extent to which that it is easier to confer
origin for, say, a Sub-Saharan LDC than for an
LDC in Asia, such differences will represent a
type of discrimination against LDCs in Asia.
A harmonisation program for non-preferential
ROO is currently in place (cf. Box 4.2) and
provides a potential solution to the rules of
origin problem, as it creates the possibility that
the QUAD will apply non-preferential ROO in
their GSP systems as well. This would benefit
LDCs, not only because transaction costs would
be reduced, but probably also because ROO in
many cases are stricter for preferential trade
than for non-preferential trade. This has
generally been the case for the QUAD countries
(Vermulst 1994). 
However, one should not be too optimistic
regarding a harmonisation of preferential ROO.
Countries tend to design ROO in their GSP
systems to suit their domestic interests. These
vary among countries. Many countries have
signalled that they do not want to discuss
preferential ROO until the harmonisation of
non-preferential ROO is completed. The
problems related to non-preferential ROO are
difficult enough by themselves. Moreover, the
countries know that once an agreement is
obtained on non-preferential ROO, the pressure
to do the same for preferential ROO will be
strong. These mechanisms work together to
reduce the probability of reaching a multilateral
agreement on ROO.
4.4.1 Rules of origin and utilisation of GSP
Products that are wholly obtained in a country
will always confer origin in that country. Rules of
origin are therefore not a problem for the
majority of LDC exports because most
agricultural products and raw materials are
naturally wholly produced within one country.
The problems arise with industrialised
products, in particular with respect to textiles
and clothing. Several Asian LDCs have a
considerable capacity to produce apparel if they
are allowed to freely import the intermediates.
Their ability to do so is, however, limited by the
rules of origin in the QUAD.
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One indicator of the significance of rules of
origin is to compare the imports that would be
eligible for GSP treatment if formal
requirements were fulfilled with the imports
that actually receive preferences. 
As shown in Table 4.3, a substantial share of the
imports that are covered by GSP does not
receive preferential treatment. Notice that the
utilisation rate for LCD beneficiaries in the EU,
the US and Canada is lower than the utilisation
rate for all beneficiaries, even though LDCs
typically receive a higher preference margin. 
In other cases, low preferential margins may be
too low to warrant the efforts needed to receive
GSP treatment. A low utilisation rate for Angola
in the US might for instance be explained by the
fact that the preference margin is only a few
cents per barrel. 
However, non-compliance with rules of origin is
also a major explanatory factor. By looking at
utilisation rates in the EU we observe that some
Asian countries that typically have large exports
of textiles and clothing, have a very low
utilisation rate, even though preferential
margins are significant. For instance, only 27%
of the imports from Bangladesh to the EU
receive preferences, although most of this trade
is apparel and thus receives a substantial
preferential margin. The explanation is that
Bangladesh is not able to satisfy EU rules of
origin for apparel based on woven fabrics
(although they qualify for knitted products).
Bangladesh has to rely on imported fabrics
(only 15% of woven fabrics are produced
domestically, as compared to 60% of knitted
fabrics). Without building up a domestic textile
industry, Bangladesh is likely to face similar
problems in the US and Canada if textiles or
clothing products receive larger preferences in
these markets. In this case, more liberal rules of
origin would be far more important than simply
a harmonisation. 
Box 4.2 Rules of origin
Rules of origin are the criteria used to define where a product was made. In a completely open world, there is no need
for rules of origin because it would make no difference where the products originate. Moreover, when there are tariff
barriers, the importance of origin is modest as long as trade-restrictive measures are used non-discriminately. Rules of
origin are an essential part of trade rules because a number of policies discriminate between exporting countries, such
as quotas, anti-dumping actions, countervailing duties and preferential tariffs (GSP and free trade agreements).
WTO members shall ensure that their rules of origin are transparent; that they do not have restricting, distorting or
disruptive effects on international trade; that they are administered in a consistent, uniform, impartial and reasonable
manner; and that they are based on a positive standard (they should state what does confer origin rather than what
does not).
According to the WTO agreement on rules of origin, WTO members shall aim for harmonisation of non-preferential
rules of origin. There is no similar obligation as regards preferential rules of origin.
Sources: http://www.wto.org and interviews in the WTO secretariat.
Table 4.3 Utilisation rate of GSP preferences in the QUAD, 1997
LDCs All beneficiaries
Imports GSP Imports GSP Utilisation rate Utilisation rate
covered (1000 USD) received (1000 USD) (%) (%)
Canada 8 537 4 656 54.5 65.9
EU 2 888 780 770 768 26.7 55.9
Japan 313 753 228 913 73.0 42.5
USA 2 719 570 790 655 29.1 61.1
Source: UNCTAD (1999d)
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4.4.2 Two different origin principles
The general rule when inputs are imported is
that products must undergo a substantial
transformation in order to confer origin. Two
different principles or tests are applied to define
a substantial transformation. At times, both
types of criteria are used in combination: 
1) Change of tariff heading. A change must
normally occur at the four-digit level. The
change in heading is referred to as a tariff
jump. 
2) A percentage criterion, either as a
maximum percentage of imported
intermediates, or as a minimum percentage
of domestic content. 
There is no clear answer to the question of
which principle would favour LDCs.
Nonetheless, we can point out the following:
• The percentage criterion is less transparent
and predictable than the change of tarif f
heading because a separate judgement is
needed for each exporting country and
because prices and costs may vary over
time.
• The percentage criterion penalizes efficient,
low cost producers.
• The percentage criterion may easily be
adjusted incrementally. Even a small
adjustment may have severe impacts on
LDC exporters.
• If the percentage criterion is used, LDCs
would want the requirements for domestic
content to be below 20–25% in order to take
full advantage of preferential market access.
For instance, the value added (as a share of
product price) of a typical product in
Bangladesh, say a woven pair of trousers,
produced on the basis of imported fabrics is
27% (Rahman and Bhattacharya 2000). The
percentage increases when grey fabrics are
imported and when accessories are
produced domestically, but only when
production is based on imported yarn, the
value added exceeds 50%.21
• When the change-of-tariff-heading approach
is used, LDCs will benefit if the required
number of tariff jumps is small. In the EU
and Japan, textiles and clothing must satisfy
a “double jump” in order to confer origin.
LDCs such as Bangladesh, which do not
produce woven fabrics domestically, are
unable to fulfill this requirement. If only a
single jump was required, the potential gain
for LDCs of duty-free and quota-free access
would be substantially enhanced.
Table 4.4 EU GSP imports and utilisation rates by country, 1997
Beneficiary Imports GSP Imports GSP Utilisation rate
country covered (1000 USD) received (1000 USD) (%)
Afghanistan 10 862 2 292 21.1
Bangladesh 1 940 533 532 478 27.4
Bhutan 1 293 190 14.7
Cambodia 176 835 18 359 10.4
Laos 99 527 17 228 17.3
Maldives 26 603 18 757 70.5
Myanmar 137 847 18 705 13.6
Nepal 171 694 135 869 79.1
Yemen 32 762 18 662 57.0
TOTAL LDCs 2 888 780 770 768 26.7
All GSP beneficiaries 115 939 676 64 784 642 55.9
Source: UNCTAD (1999d)
21) This implies that clothing exporters in Bangladesh will not be fully able to take advantage of the rules on regional cumulation
in the Everything-But-Arms regulation in the EU. Under the cumulation rule, more than 50% of the product value must stem from
domestic sources.
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We have described the present import barriers
faced by Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in
the European Union, the USA, Japan and
Canada (i.e. the QUAD) and analysed which
benefits the LDCs could possibly gain from
duty-free and quota-free access in these
markets. We have also discussed how
preferential trade arrangements for the LDCs
should be designed in order to serve their
interests. Our main findings and conclusions
are:
Present import barriers
All QUAD countries currently provide
preferential market access for the LDCs under
their respective Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP). The scope and depth of the
preferential trade agreements vary greatly
within the QUAD. 
In addition to the GSP, all LDCs but the Asian
ones, benefit from the Cotonou Agreement with
the EU, and Sub-Saharan LDCs benefit from
special arrangements in the USA under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act. 
Due to extensive trade preferences at present,
duty-free and quota-free access will typically be
of less value for the LDCs than for other
developing countries.
Benefits from duty-free and quota-free market
access
Potential benefits of duty-free and quota-free
access include: 1) Higher prices on existing
exports, 2) Price gains from diverting sales
from other markets (other export markets or
domestic markets) to the QUAD countries, 3)
Increased value added through expansion of
production.
The aggregate benefits of duty-free and quota-free
access for the LDCs are likely to be modest, even
when measured relative to their present low
levels of income. The main reasons are that (1)
most LDCs presently enjoy quite liberal market
access in important export markets, and (2) the
ability of LDCs to take advantage of trade
preferences is limited, due to constraints on
supply capacity. 
Nevertheless, some LDCs will reap significant
benefits in a few product categories. The most
important one is clothing, but producers of
agricultural products, such as sugar and
tobacco, will benefit as well. There are also
potential benefits related to the export of rice
and meat from LDCs, but these benefits will be
more difficult to realise. 
Our measures of the gains from duty-free and
quota-free access suf fer from several
shortcomings. The most critical one is perhaps
that we have little understanding of the
relationship between higher export prices and
future supply capacities in LDCs. If higher
export prices lead to the adoption of more
productive technologies and to investment in
infrastructure, the gains from duty-free and
quota-free access may increase substantially.
However, our inquiry into the present supply
capacities in LDCs and what it would take to
bring the capacities up to levels that could boost
export volumes, leaves the sad impression that
they have a long and difficult path ahead.
Designing preferential trade arrangements
With respect to the design of preferential trade
arrangements for the LDCs, we believe that the
most important issue for the LDCs as a group is
to have the product coverage of provisions for
free market access extended to all products.
Since the benefits of duty-free access are
concentrated in a few product categories, which
typically are quite sensitive import products in
the QUAD, the importing countries may
significantly reduce the benefits for LDCs of
free market access by retaining their import
controls in only a few product categories. 
The benefits for the LDCs of free market access
would be further enhanced if the importing
countries were to make their preferential trade
arrangements more binding. At present, trade
5 Main Conclusions
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preferences for LDCs may be withdrawn at any
time because they are provided on a unilateral
and autonomous basis. The simplest way of
making preferences more binding would be for
the importing countries to notify the WTO that
their preferential trade arrangements should be
considered as binding within the WTO
framework. A number of other approaches are
available as well, including plurilateral and
multilateral solutions. Note, however, that it is
impossible to eliminate the uncertainty
surrounding preferential margins as long as
regular, non-preferential tariffs are subject to
negotiations. The benefits to be gained from
binding tarif fs the LDCs face at zero rates
should therefore not be overstated. 
The possibility of using safeguard measures may
play an important role in the liberalisation of
trade. Making trade preferences for LDCs more
binding will undoubtedly call for a revision of
the safeguard provisions as well. Although the
Agreement on Safeguards in the WTO contains
elements that may form the basis for safeguard
provisions in preferential trade arrangements,
the LDCs would have liked to see a number of
its provisions rewritten in order to allow for
more differential and favourable treatment of
the LDCs. 
In order to favour the interests of LDCs,
safeguards should be designed so that the
objectives for the importing countries can be
achieved at the smallest possible costs for the
LDCs. It follows from this general principle that
safeguards that apply to preferential trade
should 
• Address a well-defined, serious injury in the
importing country 
• Be based on a clear and restrictive
definition of serious injury
• Not be applied without a proven, causal link
between LDC imports and the injury
• Specify generous limits for LDC market
shares and LDC import growth below
which LDCs will not be targeted by
safeguards
• Not limit the overall size of the market more
than necessary
• Not prevent LDCs from capturing market
shares from other exporters
• Not be implemented without compensation
to the LDCs   
Graduation from the UN list is not a relevant
issue for most LDCs in the foreseeable future.
But when a country graduates, we recommend
that trade preferences be retained until fixed
investments are fully depreciated, e.g. for a
period of 10–20 years, in order to reduce the
costs of adjustment. Moreover, there should be
no gradual increase of import restrictions
during the transition period. 
Rules of origin are a necessary part of any
preferential trade agreement. The present rules
of origin in the importing countries are,
however, a major obstacle to the realisation of
the benefits of duty-free and quota-free market
access for LDCs, especially in the clothing
sector.
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Appendix 1 Basic LDC statistics
GDP per capita Exports of goods and Exports of goods
Country Population (million) (current USD) services (million and services
constant 1995 USD) (% of GDP)
Afghanistan 25.1
Angola 12 623 3243.3 51.8
Bangladesh 125.6 340 5841.9 13.8
Benin 5.9 388 645.7 23.3
Bhutan 0.8 524 33.2
Burkina Faso 10.7 241 392.7 13.8
Burundi 6.5 135 121 8.1
Cambodia 11.5 250 34.1
Cape Verde 0.4 1192 124.3 24.9
Central African Republic 3.5 304 294.9 15.9
Chad 7.3 233 374.0 19.3
Comoros 0.5 370 49.7 16.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. 48.2 144 2095.5
Djibouti 0.6
Equatorial Guinea 0.4 1058 751.5 101.8
Eritrea 3.9 168 135.3 19.9
Ethiopia 61.3 107 1127.2 15.8
Gambia, The 1.2 342 192.8 51.1
Guinea 7.1 508 911.9 21.6
Guinea-Bissau 1.2 177 35.4 14.9
Haiti 7.6 506 424.0 11.5
Kiribati 0.1 525
Lao PDR 5.0 254 3.7
Lesotho 2.1 385 329.9 33.5
Liberia 3.0
Madagascar 14.6 257 652.2 21.2
Malawi 10.5 160 579.2 30.5
Maldives 0.3 1402
Mali 10.6 254 778.9 23.6
Mauritania 2.5 391 471 41.1
Mozambique 16.9 230 449.6 11.7
Myanmar 44.5
Nepal 22.9 209 1151.6 23.2
Niger 10.1 202 354.7 16.3
Rwanda 8.1 250 122.8 5.4
Samoa 0.2 1038
Sao Tome and Principe 0.1 288 11.8 29.3
Sierra Leone 4.9 133 22.0
Solomon Islands 0.4 723
Somalia 9.1
Sudan 28.3 366
Tanzania 32.1 250 1010.5 18.4
Togo 4.5 339 499.7 33.7
Tuvalu
Uganda 20.9 324 951.5 10.3
Vanuatu 0.2 1315
Yemen, Rep. 16.6 260 858.3 34.5
Zambia 9.7 347 1450.6 29.4
Source: World Bank (2000).
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As pointed out in Section 3.1, the benefits of
preferential, duty-free access for the LDCs can
be broken down into (1) higher prices on
existing production and exports, (2) increased
value added from increased production, and (3)
effects on consumer welfare. Figures A2.1 and
A2.2 illustrate the relationship between these
components. 
Think of a single product that is produced and
consumed in three regions; the QUAD (Q), the
LDCs (L), and all other countries (O). The
export supply in other countries is denoted XO
and increases with the price. The import
demand in the QUAD markets is denoted MQ,
and decreases with the price. In the LDC region,
we have drawn both the demand curve (DL) and
the supply curve (SL). The export supply from
the LDCs (XL) is the difference between supply
and demand, i.e. XL = SL -DL. The equilibrium is
found where the total import demand from the
QUAD equals the total export supply from
LDCs and other countries, i.e. when 
MQ = XO + XL or MQ = XO + SL – DL
We assume that the QUAD have imposed a
uniform import tariff t. The tariff drives a wedge
between the consumer price in the QUAD
markets and the prices received by exporters
from other countries. Given that the domestic
price in the QUAD shall exceed the world
market price by the tariff rate t, the equilibrium
import quantity in the QUAD will be M0Q and the
world market price will be P0W. At this price, the
LDCs will consume the quantity D 0L, produce





QUAD. Other countries will export the quantity
X0O.
Consider now the ef fect of giving the LDCs
duty-free and quota-free access in the QUAD,
while all other countries have to pay the same
tarif fs as before. The export price of LDC
producers will now exceed the world market
price by the tariff rate t and thus be equal to the
consumer price in the QUAD (P0Q). This price
increase stimulates production in the LDCs. For
a given world market price, the LDCs will now
produce and export a larger quantity. Obviously,
increased export supply from the LDCs will
induce a positive shift in the aggregate export
supply, leading to a fall in both the world market
price and the consumer price in the QUAD. The
decline in consumer prices in the QUAD
countries leads to increased imports into the
QUAD (trade creation). But the increase is
smaller than the increase in exports from LDCs
since a lower world market price will reduce
exports from other countries (trade diversion).
Note that consumption in the LDCs increases
despite the increase in LDC exports. This is due
to increased imports into LDCs from other
countries
Appendix 2 Economic benefits of duty-free access 
(graphic illustration)
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Figure A2.2 illustrates in greater detail which
kinds of gains may accrue to the LDCs from free
market access on a preferential basis. It is
important to note that the net gains depend to a
large extent on what happens to domestic
consumers in the LDCs. Although we have not
discussed transport costs here, we will assume
that such costs will induce LDC producers to
supply their home markets before turning to the
export markets, given that they do not have
preferential access in the export markets. It is
not obvious that this pattern is continued when
LDC exporters receive preferential access in
the QUAD, because the LDC producers will
then obtain a higher price in the QUAD than in
their home markets. It may be profitable for the
LDCs to export all their produce to the QUAD
markets and satisfy domestic demand through
imports from other countries (import/export
swap). 
Benefits if import/export swaps are used  
If the LDCs export all their produce to the
QUAD and import what they need for domestic
consumption from third countries at the world
market price, the gains from preferential market
access will be as follows (see Figure A2.2):
Higher price on 
existing production: A+B+C





Note that if an import/export swap is used,
preferential market access implies gains for
both consumers and producers in LDCs.
Producers obtain higher prices in their export
market at the same time as declining world
market prices will benefit LDC consumers. This
is an important difference between preferential
market access and a multilateral reduction in
trade barriers. In the latter case, the world
market price would have increased due to
increased import demand. This would impose a
welfare loss on consumers in LDCs in general
and on net importing LDCs in particular. 
Benefits if import/export swaps are not used
LDCs will not necessarily be willing to rely on
imports for the satisfaction of domestic
consumer demand, for instance due to
Figure A2.1 Preferential market access for LDCs
22) This is the extra revenue less the additional costs. Costs are measured as the area under the supply curve, which represents
the marginal costs of production.
23) Consumer surplus is what consumers would be willing to pay for a commodity less what they actually pay. Consumer surplus
is measured as the area between the demand curve and the price line.
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considerations of security of food supplies. To
induce domestic producers to supply the
domestic market, the LDC governments might
put up import controls that ensure that the
producers get the same price on their domestic
sales as on their exports. In the absence of
transport costs, the domestic consumer price
must then be at the same level as prices in the
QUAD markets. Without the possibility of an
import/export swap, LDC consumers will be
hurt by preferential market access.
Figure A2.2 LDC gains and losses
The net benefits for an LDC of preferential
market access, given that import/export swaps
are prevented by import trade barriers, are: 
Higher price on existing production:      A+B+C
Value added of increased production: D
Reduced consumer surplus: E+F
Total benefit B+C+D
In general, we cannot use Figure A2.2 to
compare the relative benefits of preferential
market access with and without export/import
swaps because the world market price may be
lower when the LDC imposes import
restrictions. However, if LDC consumption is
small relative to the world market, as will most
often be the case, this price ef fect will be
negligible. In that case – as shown in Figure
A2.2 – the utilisation of import/export swaps
will make the LDCs better of f by the area
A+E+F. The improvement is entirely due to




In the long run, the impact of any improvement
in access for LDCs in their export markets on
their economic development depends on their
capacity to make use of these opportunities. The
purpose of this appendix is to evaluate the
current supply capacity of LDCs in general and
the likely development of this in the coming
years. Of course, the possibilities for exploiting
gains from improved market access depend on
supply capacities for specific products and the
future changes in these, which will vary across
products and countries. Given the nature of this
study, it is not possible to be specific with
respect to products and countries. Instead, we
aim at painting a picture of “the average LDC”.
We start by describing aggregate productivity in
LDCs and their productive capacity using the
most recent data available.24 In order to assess
the likely path of their future capacity to
produce and export goods and services, we
then look at current investment in productive
inputs and current policies. The conclusion is
that export supply in LDCs is likely to be fairly
inelastic in the short to medium term.
A3.2. An assessment of current LDC
productivity and capacity 
A3.2.1 Productivity levels and their determinants
The most important criterion (though not the
only one) used by the UN in classifying
countries as least developed is income. The
World Bank classifies most countries in the
world by income; according to their
classification 40 out of the 47 LDCs are
countries with low income per capita.25 This
means that LDCs constitute about two thirds of
the countries in the low-income group.
However, the average LDC is still poorer than
the average low-income country; in the 1990s,
the difference was about 40% when income is
measured in terms of purchasing power.
Therefore, even though a few LDCs (generally
very small) are (lower) middle-income
countries, it seems most relevant to compare
their performance to the group of low-income
countries. Moreover, it is likely that many of
their most important competitors (today or in
the near future) in export markets are low-
income countries.
Table A3.1 shows that both totally and with
respect to the important agricultural sector, the
average worker in LDCs is significantly less
productive than his counterpart in low-income
countries.26 At the end of the 20th century, the
labour productivity gap between LDCs and low-
income countries stands at 65%.27 Since the
average for low-income countries includes the
LDCs, the gap between LDCs and non-LDC low-
income countries is even greater than this high
figure suggests. In agriculture, which is
important in terms of employment, output and
exports in both groups of countries, the gap is
even larger. Even though what little data there is
seems to suggest that the agricultural
productivity of land is about the same in LDCs
and low-income countries, the conclusion that
Appendix 3 Supply Capacity in Least Developed Countries
24) Except where otherwise noted, the data are taken from or based on the World Bank (2000). The usual caveat about data quality
in poor countries applies. Moreover, note that the number of countries included in the averages shown below has been maximised,
which means that it varies both across variables and periods.
25) Tuvalu is the only LDC not classified by income by the World Bank. Low-income countries are countries with a GNP per capita
below $760 in 1998.
26) Unfortunately, the data in the World Bank (2000) do not allow us to calculate labour productivity in manufacturing. Mayer
(2000) gives estimates of productivity levels in the first half of the 1990s relative to 1980 in the manufacturing sector as a whole as
well as in nine sub-sectors for 14 low-income countries, of which five are LDCs (see Table 7, p. 24). The picture painted by these
estimates is mixed. For example, in Zambia labour productivity in manufacturing had dropped by 40%, while the corresponding
numbers for the Central African Republic and Bangladesh were 30% and 20%, respectively. On the other hand, in the Gambia, there
has been a 20% increase since 1980 and in Malawi the increase was as large as 60%.
27) And these averages even mask the fact that over the course of the decade, the latter group of countries have improved their
productivity rate by more than 50% while for the LDCs, productivity essentially remained stagnant.
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the poverty of LDCs is caused by the low
productivity of their productive inputs is hard to
escape. In this sense, the supply capacity of
LDCs seems limited, since it will take large
amounts of inputs to produce extra output.
Table A3.1 Productivity in constant 1995 US$
Variable Country group Average 1990–94 Average 1995–98
GDP per worker LDCs 459.2 473.8
Low income 608.3 780.3
Ratio 0.75 0.61
Agricultural value added per worker LDCs 302.5 300.5
Low income 528.7 528.8
Ratio 0.57 0.57
Agricultural value added per hectare of agricultural land LDCs 218.0
Low income 232.7
Ratio 0.94
Notes: GDP per worker is GDP at factor cost divided by the economically active population. 
Table A3.2 is a good place to start a discussion
on the causes of the low productivity in LDCs. It
is based on data from an important recent study
of the productivity of nations (Hall and Jones
1999). They measure labour productivity
relative to the US for 126 other countries in 1988
(the US is the country with the highest level of
output per worker in their study), and relate the
productivity gap to inputs of fixed capital and
human capital, as well as to total factor
productivity (TFP). TFP is a residual category
incorporating the differences in productivity,
which are not attributable to different levels of
specific inputs.
We first of all see that production per worker in
LDCs was on average only about 4.5% of the US
level.28 This enormous productivity gap was a
function both of the amount of inputs of capital
and of TFP. The physical capital intensity of the
average LDC was more than 40% below that of
the US. With respect to human capital, the gap
was even greater. Hence, not surprisingly, LDC
workers have much less capital, both fixed and
human, to work with. This is an important
reason why their productivity is below that of
average workers in every other income group.
However, the major reason for the productivity
gap – which is 20% even compared to low-
income countries – is the low level of TFP.
While the figures in Table 4.2 refer to a single
year, this conclusion is in line with that of a
number of recent studies which find that TFP is
more important than capital accumulation when
it comes to explaining cross-country differences
in income and growth.29 The residual category
called TFP is a function of factors such as the
level of technology and the allocation of inputs
among sectors. In turn these are influenced by
the economic policies and institutions of a
country. Since the accumulation of capital is also
to a large extent determined by policies and
institutions, there clearly is a great potential for
gains from institutional and policy reforms in
terms of expanding the productive capacities of
LDCs.
28) It is noteworthy that there are two outliers among the LDCs, Yemen and Bangladesh, which at levels of production per worker
of 21.2 and 12.7, respectively, are head and shoulders above the rest of the group. If they are excluded, the average drops to 4.1. 
29) See e.g. King and Levine (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (1997), Prescott (1998) and Easterly and Levine (2000).
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One important caveat with respect to
accounting exercises such as the one Table A3.2
is based on is that capital stocks are not directly
observable, and so one is forced to rely on
estimates based on investment rates. But
investment need not produce capital – an
accumulated input valued for its future
contributions to output. The importance of this
point is obvious to anyone who has ever visited
a poor country. However, as pointed out by
Pritchett (2000), this has been ignored in
empirical studies of growth and income. The
numerous and infamous “white elephants”
demonstrate that for a variety of reasons, this
problem is most severe with respect to public
investment. An important implication is that
high rates of capital accumulation (whether in
the private or the public sector) need not result
in high growth rates.30 Indeed, in this respect
improving the ef ficiency of investment –
particularly in the public sector – might be at
least as important as high levels of investment
spending. 
One type of public investment which is
particularly important for the expansion of
exports is investment in public infrastructure.
Getting the products to the markets (and inputs
to the place of production) requires an adequate
and reliable transport infrastructure, e.g. roads
and ports of sufficient quality. This takes on
added importance in LDCs due to the fact that
most of them are located far from the QUAD
markets. Moreover, 16 of them are landlocked
and thus face the disadvantages of having to
send most of their products through
neighbouring countries. These include
additional costs such as fees for shipping and
handling and duties to the government of the
transit country.31 Thus, it becomes even more
important that the transport infrastructure in
landlocked countries does not impose avoidable
burdens on exporters due to lack of capacity or
low quality. Moreover, a study undertaken by
UNCTAD (UNCTAD 1999b) concluded that in
Africa, where most of the LDCs are located,
intra-national transport costs are for the most
part higher than international transport costs.
This probably reflects the fact that in Africa, as
well as in LDCs in general, the quality of
transport infrastructure is poor. For example, in
1988 25% of the main paved roads and 51% of the
main unpaved roads were in poor condition.32,33
Other types of infrastructure are important for
export production as well. Communicating with
foreign markets in today’s world presupposes a
telecommunications infrastructure which is
Table A3.2 Productivity levels and sources, 1988 (% of US figures)
Productivity Sources of productivity
Production Physical capital Human capital Total factor 
per worker intensity per worker productivity
LDCs 4.5 % 58.1 % 39.7 % 19.4 %
Low-income 5.4 % 61.7 % 41.3 % 21.1 %
Ratio 0.83 0.94 0.96 0.92
30) Another important implication is that accounting for the contribution of various factors to income levels and growth is not
possible without an estimate of the efficiency of investment. Studies that ignore this variable will invariably attribute a greater role
to physical capital accumulation than is warranted; likewise the contribution of TFP will be underestimated. The measurement of
human capital is encumbered by a number of other methodological and empirical problems as well, see e.g. Pritchett (1997) and
Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (1997). In which direction these problems bias empirical estimates of human capital is difficult to say.
31) Limao and Venables (1999), for instance, find that the median landlocked country in their sample has transport costs which are
58% higher than the median coastal country. Also see Radelet and Sachs (1998), who show that natural geography has a strong
influence on shipping costs, with high shipping costs in turn causing low growth of manufactured exports and GDP per capita, and
UNCTAD (1999a).
32) These numbers and those that follow are taken from the largest database on infrastructure indicators assembled so far. It is
described in Canning (1998).
33) The scale of this problem in the year in question in countries like Guinea (50% and 100%, respectively), Guinea-Bissau (35% and
88%) and Chad (90% and 100%) is simply mind-boggling.
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both extensive in terms of coverage and
reliable. Telephone systems in LDCs can hardly
be called reliable; it has been estimated that in
1990 only 60% of the calls placed locally got
through. In Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Lao PDR,
Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritania, Nepal,
Sudan and Uganda, 50% or more of such calls
failed! Finally, modern production depends on
the supply of energy. Reliability is an important
issue with respect to energy supply as well. For
example, violent changes in voltage can destroy
electronic equipment, such as computers,
unless it is protected by security devices. Such
fluctuations are not uncommon in LDCs. Brown-
outs – the disruption of electricity supplies – is
also a well-known phenomenon in these
countries. Both of these problems make for cost
disadvantages for LDC producers due to direct
and indirect losses from a lack or poor quality of
public infrastructure. The poor quality of energy
supply networks is well illustrated by the fact
that in 1990, 20% of the electricity produced did
not reach an end user in the average LDC.34
Population growth is rapid in many LDCs. This
makes for large cohorts of youths which have to
be supported by small cohorts of adults. If the
degree of underemployment and unem-
ployment of labour can be reduced, this
constitutes an enormous potential for expanding
output through increases in labour supply. On
the other hand, as is too often the case today, if
young adults cannot find productive
employment, their talent and effort are wasted,
and they must continue to be supported by
older generations without contributing to the
economy. Such an outcome is particularly
depressing when the newcomers to the labour
force have more education on average than
older workers (this is typically the case in
developing countries) because then past
investments in education are wasted and future
private investment could be discouraged.
Moreover, the rapid growth of the population
generates a need for such public services as
health and education. If met, taxation will
increase now or in the future (when any public
debt issued to pay for the expansion of services
has to be repaid). This could discourage the
economic activities on which the taxes are
levied. If the demand for such services is not
satisfied by the government, given low levels of
income which are unequally distributed, most
young people will not accumulate human
capital. This will hamper the growth in future
capacity. LDCs are walking this tightrope now.
In 1995–98, the economically active population
only constituted 53.2% of the total.35 Since life
expectancy is low in these countries, this is
mostly due to a large share of individuals below
15 years of age.
Insight into the level and rate of accumulation of
human capital can be gained by looking at
education levels. In constructing Table A3.3, we
have made use of the best available cross-
country data on educational achievement. 1995
is the latest year for which data have been
collected. In that year, the average adult in an
LDC had only 2.37 years of schooling. In
countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and
Niger the average was less than a year! Equally
as bad is the fact that over half of the population
in LDCs aged 15 or above had no schooling.
And it is equally disturbing to note that gender
gaps are large. For example, almost two thirds
of adult females had no schooling in 1995 while
less than half of the males were in that sad
situation. Since there is no reason to believe that
ability is distributed unequally between the
sexes, this implies an enormous waste of talent
in LDCs.
34) In countries such as Bangladesh (34%), Haiti (31%), Mozambique (29%) and Nepal (29%), 30% or more of the electricity
produced was lost that year.
35) Corresponding numbers for the three income groups are 61.1% (low income), 62.8% (middle income) and 67% (high income).
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The projections of Barro and Lee (2000) for the
year 2000 suggest improvement, but this is minor
compared to the scale of the task. Moreover, it
takes time to accumulate educational capital, so
rapid increases in education levels are not to be
expected. Thus, in the near future levels of
human capital will continue to be low when
measured by this indicator. This sad conclusion is
reinforced by numbers which show that LDCs are
not managing to provide their children with
schooling. Only about 60% of the children in the
relevant age classes go to primary school. The
corresponding figure for secondary school is
only half of that again. Needless to say, this is way
below what other countries achieve, even at
roughly comparable levels of income. Moreover,
a significant proportion of the children leaves
before completing the first level of schooling, no
doubt in order to contribute to family income by
working. However, this means that their future
contribution to national income will be much less
than it could have been. In the globalised
economy of today, the importance of education is
magnified, so this does not augur well for the
future export supply capacity of LDCs.
The situation is not much better with respect to
health. As already mentioned, life expectancy is
extremely low in LDCs. In 1998, it was a paltry
51.3 years. A third of the children were
malnourished and 15% of them died before their
fifth birthday. The sad state of the health system
in LDCs is clearly to blame for this human
calamity. For example, in the 1990s there were
on average 833 patients per doctor and health
staf f only attended 36% of bir ths. There is
certainly an enormous need for expanding and
upgrading health systems in the LDCs.
A3.2.2 Sources of low labour productivity in
agriculture
The importance of the agricultural sector to the
economies of LDCs – in 1998 it constituted 33%
of GDP and employed 72% of the labour force
(UNCTAD 2000a) – and the fact that improved
market access in the EU and Japan would
mainly concern agricultural products imply that
a closer look is warranted. A snapshot of
agricultural productivity in LDCs has already
been provided; Table A3.4 gives some clues to
why labour productivity in particular is low in
this sector. First of all, we see that the level of
mechanisation is low in LDC agriculture. Low-
income countries have on average twice the
number of tractors per hectare of arable land.
Secondly, cultivation is mainly rain-fed and not
based on irrigation. Once again, the gap
between LDCs and low-income countries is
huge: while on average more than a quarter of
the crop land of the former group of countries is
irrigated, in LDCs the corresponding number is
only half this. The fact that this is comparable to
the share of cropland irrigated in high-income
countries (not shown) is irrelevant because
LDC agriculture faces quite different conditions
in terms of e.g. climate and soil. For example,
African countries face variable rainfall, high
evaporation and thin soil layers, conditions
which place a premium on a stable water supply.
In fact, 40 out of the 47 main LDCs can be
defined as tropical countries, and being located
in the tropics has been shown to impose severe
constraints on economic development in
general and agricultural production in particular
(with the exception of tropical products, of
course).36 Since irrigation systems are a form of
infrastructure (whether privately or publicly
Table A3.3 Educational attainment 1995
Total years of education Percentage no education
Country group Adult pop. Females Males Adult pop. Females Males
LDCs 2.37 1.79 2.97 57.5 66.0 48.7
Low-income 3.03 2.36 3.71 50.4 58.9 41.8
Ratio 0.78 0.76 0.80 1.14 1.12 1.17
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data in Barro and Lee (2000).
36) See e.g. the classic study by Kamarck (1976) and the recent contributions of Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Gallup, Sachs and
Mellinger (1998). The latter calculate that in 1995 the average income of temperate regions measured in terms of purchasing power
was four and a half times that of tropical ones.
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provided), Table A3.4 illustrates that the general
picture of infrastructure in LDCs painted above
is accurate with respect to the agricultural
sector as well. Thirdly, other inputs associated
with modern agriculture also seem to be lacking
in LDC agriculture. Fertiliser consumption is of
minor importance in LDCs compared to the
extent it is used in countries in other income
groups.
Table A3.4 Productivity in constant 1995 US$
Average 1990–94 Average 1995–97
Tractors per hectare of arable land1 LDCs 0.3 0.3
Low income 0.5 0.6
Ratio 0.6 0.5
Irrigated land (% of cropland) LDCs 12.4 12.1
Low income 27.9 29.7
Ratio 0.44 0.41
Fertilizer consumption LDCs 154.6 169.9
(100 grams per hectare of arable land) Low income 994.8 1174.7
Ratio 0.16 0.14
1 The average in column four is over 1995–96.
This lack of complementary inputs is surely an
important reason why agricultural workers in
LDCs are less productive than their
counterparts in other countries. Hence, it
constitutes an important barrier to expanding
supply in LDCs. Clearly, there is a great need for
investment in agriculture if the potential gains
from improved market access for agricultural
goods in QUAD markets are to be realised. This
is all the more important because it is unlikely
that LDCs will be able to expand the agricultural
area much. On average, they now have less
productive land than other countries. Over
1990–94, for example, agricultural land
constituted only about 36% of the total land area
compared to 40% for all developing countries.37
Given that much of this area already is marginal
in terms of agricultural production, as illustrated
by the expansion of the Sahara desert in Africa
and the soil erosion on the steep hillsides of
Nepal, there are in general severe limits to
expanding production through extending the
land under cultivation. Hence, the extent of the
supply response to improved market access will
be determined by the extent to which inputs
other than land can be applied more intensively
in LDC agriculture.
Overall, this section has shown that productivity
and capacity are currently low in LDCs. The
next section discusses the likelihood of this
situation improving in the coming years.
A3.3 Improving productivity and expanding
capacity: economic policy perspectives
We have seen that there is a great need for
investment in LDCs if their supply capacity is to
increase. This conclusion holds with respect to
both fixed and human capital, and covers both
the economy in general and the agricultural
sector in particular. By investigating current
levels of investment, we can evaluate whether
improvement is ahead. From Table A3.5, it does
seem that these countries are making an effort
to rectify the situation. Rates of net domestic
fixed investment are comparable to those of
both low-income and middle-income (not
shown) countries. However, these are estimates
of total net investment, i.e. including public
investment. Over 1990–94, we have estimated
that the shares of the private and public sector
gross investment, in total gross investment were
about the same.38 Thus, it is important to bear in
mind that the efficiency of the investment taking
place might be low.39
37) These numbers have been calculated from FAOSTAT data.
38) These estimates are based on data in the Global Development Network Growth Database assembled by Easterly and Yu (2000).
39) The astonishing conclusion of Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack (2000) – that in Africa neither private nor public investment is
productive – testifies to the importance of this issue.
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Moreover, the average rate of net domestic
savings was negative both in the first and in the
second half of the last decade. This observation
has two important implications: 1) that LDCs
have not managed to reduce their rate of
indebtedness during the 1990s; 2) that
sustaining the investment ef fort depends on
financial flows from abroad.
Table A3.5 Savings and investment 1990s
Average 1990–94 Average 1995–98
Net domestic savings (% of GDP) LDCs -3.9 -2.2
Low-income 2.0 1.5
Net domestic fixed investment (% of GDP) LDCs 11.5 12.1
Low-income 13.1 13.5
Table A3.6 Debt indicators LDCs 1990s
Present value Total debt service Total debt service PPG debt service 
of debt (% of GNP) (% of exports of (% of central government
goods and services) current revenue)
% of exports % of GNP Average Average Average Average Average Average
of goods and (1998) 1990–94 1995–98 1990–94 1995–98 1990–94 1995–98
services (1997)
250.3 88.9 2.8 3.6 14.6 13.9 15.6 16.5
High levels of debt are currently a major
problem for the LDCs. In fact, more than half of
them (26) are classified as heavily indebted by
the World Bank. In present value terms, they
owed almost 90% of their gross national product
in 1998 (Table A3.6) Although the HIPC (Highly
Indebted Poor Countries) initiative holds the
promise of reducing the debt to manageable
levels for many LDCs, they would still have to
adjust in order to qualify for debt relief.40 This
means that the timing and magnitude of any
reduction are uncertain. Moreover, what is not
forgiven must be repaid at some point in time.
Hence, there is uncertainty about future tax
rates. This might deter investment in physical
capital, which is often irreversible, making
investors reluctant to commit themselves in the
face of uncertainty about future returns, of
which taxes are one important determinant.
Table A3.6 also reveals that the drain caused by
debt service is a major determinant of the poor
fiscal performance of LDCs. More than 15% of
the central government’s revenue is on average
spent on servicing public and publicly
guaranteed debt (PPG). While fiscal data for
LDCs are sparse, an analysis of 17 such
countries for which data exist shows that
interest payments by themselves constituted
8.8% of total public expenditure in 1990–94. In
sum, these bits and pieces of data go a long way
towards explaining why the overall budget
deficit, including grants, reached almost 5% of
GDP in the first half of the 1990s. Since grants
should not really be counted as ordinary
revenues, the fact that total expenditure
exceeded current revenue by 9% of GDP in this
period underscores even more strongly that if
LDCs are to improve their savings rates, public
saving must increase. 
Moreover, foreign aid is the only really
important source of external financing for
LDCs. Figures A3.1a) and A3.1b) show that in
the 1990s aid flows have been several orders of
magnitude larger than inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI), and FDI is the second most
important source of foreign funds for LDCs.
40) At the end of 2000, 30 of the 41 HIPCs were LDCs. Of these, two (Angola and Yemen) had been categorised as sustainable
cases, one (LAO PDR) was not seeking debt relief, 22 had and 11 had not reached the decision point. 
76
There are of course many reasons for the
extreme dependency of LDCs on foreign aid.
They are not creditworthy in private
international capital markets. Their financial
markets are underdeveloped. Thus, neither
private bank lending nor portfolio flows are
important to these countries. Although there
has been some improvement during the 1990s,
FDI bypasses LDCs to a large extent. Thus,
given that foreign aid flows have declined
sharply in the latter half of the 1990s and cannot
be expected to make a major recovery, LDC
governments must address their own
imbalances immediately.41 In fact, this might be
Figure A3.1a Foreign Aid in the 1990s
Figure A3.1b Foreign Direct Investment in the 1990s
41) The figure in fact underestimates the fall in aid since the flows are measured in nominal terms. Also note that this means that
the increase in FDI in the latter half of the decade is not as significant as it seems.
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an opportunity to reduce their extreme
dependence on aid, something which is
particularly important because inflows of aid
discriminate against export production by
appreciating the real exchange rate.
In combination with significant debt relief, fiscal
reforms will free resources for public
investment in areas that are important to supply
capacity – infrastructure, education and health.
However, this is only a potential, and there is no
guarantee that LDC governments will make the
most of an improvement in the fiscal situation. If
their current prioritisation of health and
education is anything to go by, one should not
be too optimistic.42 Neither spending on
education nor spending on health seems to be
given the priority needed to address the deficits.
GDP shares of educational expenditure are
below those of low-income countries (Table
A3.7), and we know from Table A3.3 that today
the LDCs lag behind these countries with
respect to educational attainment. Similarly, as a
proportion of GDP, health spending in LDCs is
below the share of resources low-income
countries devote to health. However, the share
of public spending on health is on a par with or
exceeds that of low-income countries. Still,
given low income levels and severe
demographic pressures, the absolute amount of
resources devoted is unlikely to make for much
progress in education and health in the next
decade or so. This conclusion is strengthened if
we take into account the fact that several studies
show that public spending (whether on
education or health) has little effect, if any, on
outcomes.43 This might be due to corruption or
mismanagement, or simply reflect that the
composition of spending is inoptimal.44 Thus,
once again we must bear in mind that what
matters for outcomes is both levels of spending
and the efficiency of spending.
42) LDCs seem to devote a greater share of their expenditures to capital outlays than low-income countries. Comparing 17 LDCs
with 29 low-income counties reveals that over 1990–94 capital expenditures constituted a third of total expenditures in the former
group, while in the latter this share was only a fourth. We do not know what proportion of these outlays is related to infrastructure
investment nor the efficiency of spending.
43) See e.g. Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett (1997), Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson (1999), as well
as the references cited therein.
44) For example, a study by the World Bank (1995) shows that developing countries tend to devote a much larger share of their
education budgets to higher education than OECD countries do, even though the social returns to primary and secondary education
exceed the return on higher education. Other common examples of misallocation are schools without schoolbooks and hospitals
without medicine.
Table A3.7 Spending on health and education in the 1990s
Average 1990–94 Average 1995–98
Variable Group Education Health Education Health
Total spending (% of GDP) LDCs 2.8 3.8 2.6 4.1
Low-income 3.3 4.1 3.0 4.2
Public Spending (% of GDP) LDCs 3.5 2.0 3.4 2.4
Low-income 3.7 2.0 3.5 2.1
Note: Public spending on education is in % of GNP, and these averages are over 1990–93 and 1994–97 (1994–96 for low-income
countries), respectively.
For private investors, fiscal policy is only one
among several different types of public policies
which are important for their decisions. In fact,
macroeconomic policy uncertainty and volatility
have repeatedly been shown to be detrimental
to investment and growth. Table A3.8
demonstrates that the record of LDCs in this
respect is mixed. In terms of inflation, LDCs do
not seem to do too badly if one excludes Angola
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which
have experienced hyperinflation. However, with
respect to exchange rates there is clearly room
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for improvement. The black market premium,
defined as the ratio of the parallel market rate to
the official rate minus one, is a good indicator of
the extent to which official exchange rate policy
is compatible with other policies, as well as
other economic fundamentals. That is, it is a
good proxy for overvaluation of the currency.
While once again the average is not way out of
line, it excludes the extreme outliers
Afghanistan, Liberia and Myanmar.45 In the
worst of these, Liberia, the premium
approached 5000%, which most likely is a world
record. And overall, a third of the countries for
which there is data had premiums exceeding
20% on average, which must be considered
high.46 Exchange rate overvaluation penalises
the export sectors by reducing their revenues
measured in terms of the national currency.
Thus, if sustained over time, such policies
discourages investment in these sectors.
45) Sudan was also excluded from the average because the figures seemed wildly implausible. The ratio of the official to the parallel
rate was about nine in 1997 and 1998, implying that people exchanging currencies in the parallel market only would get one ninth of
what they would get in a bank. It seems highly unlikely that a parallel market could exist in such a case. 
46) This is in fact one of the criteria used by Sachs and Warner (1995) to determine whether an economy is open or closed.
Table A3.8 Financial and monetary indicators in the 1990s
Avg. 1990–94 Avg. 1995–98
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)1) 22.3 15.7
Black market premium2),4) 15.1
Real interest rate (%)3) 7.7 8.0
Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP 25.9 25.8
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate) 7.8 11.7
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus LIBOR) 16.6 20.7
Notes: Includes all LDCs for which there are data except: 1) Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo; 2) Afghanistan, Liberia,
Myanmar and Sudan; 3) Excluding Angola; 4) second average is for 1996–98.
Figure A3.2 Real Effective Exchange Rates (1995=100)
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That all is not well with the exchange rate
policies of LDCs is also illustrated by Figure
A3.2, which records the development of the real
effective exchange rates (REERs) of the most
important LDCs for which there are data. This
variable is defined as the weighted average of a
country’s exchange rates with its major trading
partners divided by a price deflator (of e.g.
import costs). The figure paints a disturbing
picture of extreme volatility in some countries.
Malawi is the worst case; from 1993 to 1994, for
example, its REER depreciated by 40%. Only two
years later, it appreciated by almost the same
amount, and then another two years on it
depreciated by 27%. In such circumstances, it is
clearly impossible for exporters to predict their
returns.47 This will negatively af fect their
willingness to invest. Governments of countries
such as Malawi should take a leaf out of the
book of the government of Lesotho, which has
been the most successful LDC in terms of
economic growth over the last decades. Figure
A3.2 illustrates that among other things, the
government of Lesotho has managed to keep
the real exchange rate relatively stable, thus
making an important contribution towards
keeping the macroeconomic environment its
producers encounter predictable.48
Returning to Table A3.8, we have a few final
points to make about monetary and financial
policies and the development of the financial
sectors of LDCs. Firstly, on average the real
interest rate is positive, but not extremely high.
Thus, at least in the 1990s LDC governments
have not pursued a policy of financial
repression, which governments in many
developing countries did in the 1970s and 1980s,
with major negative consequences for the
accumulation of capital. Saving is not
particularly attractive when rates of return are
negative, but real interest rates of 7–8% provide
healthy returns to savings without unduly
discouraging investment.
Secondly, the financial sectors of LDCs are
underdeveloped. This can be seen from the ratio
of money and quasi money (M2) as a
percentage of GDP, which is only about 25%.49 In
high-income countries, this ratio is well above
50%, implying that the economies of the LDCs
are to a considerable extent still not monetised.
More advanced financial institutions such as
banks and stock markets are of even less
importance. 
Thirdly, there is evidence of weak competition
in the financial sector, as measured by the gap
between lending and deposit rates. An average
spread of almost 12% in the latter half of the
decade is clearly not a sign of fierce competition
for customers. This discourages investment,
which is to a large extent financed by borrowed
funds in LDCs, and savings intermediation. The
latter is important in allocating capital to the
most productive firms and sectors of the
economy; and we have seen that TFP is very low
in LDCs. A well-functioning financial sector also
pools risks, of which there are plenty for LDC
producers. Thus, financial development in
general and improved regulation of financial
markets in particular could make an important
contribution towards building future supply
capacity.50
Finally, the spreads of lending interest rates
over the London Interbank Overnight Rate
(LIBOR) demonstrate both that LDCs are
considered highly risky by international capital
markets,51 which among other things (such as
political risk) is probably related to the volatility
of real exchange rates, as shown in figure A3.2,
47) Moreover, one should not forget that this uncertainty comes in addition to a host of other factors which are highly volatile in
LDCs. An example is the terms of trade, which affect producers of exports both directly through their effect on the prices they
receive for their products and are charged for their imported inputs and indirectly through their effect on the government’s fiscal
position and the availability of foreign exchange. The extreme volatility of LDC terms of trade is well illustrated by the case of Guinea-
Bissau. It saw a deterioration of 28% from 1990 to 1992, followed by an increase of 36% in the next year and another 28% drop from
1993 to 1995.
48) See e.g. Elbadawi (1998) for an empirical analysis which documents the importance of keeping the real exchange rate stable at
its equilibrium level for non-traditional exports from developing countries. 
49) M2 includes small and short-term monetary instruments such as currency and savings and demand deposits.
50) On the role of the financial sector in economic development, see the review by Levine (1997).
51) LIBOR is the interest rate charged by London banks for funds lent to other banks, repayable in one day.
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and the lack of competition in domestic financial
markets. This completes a picture of bleak
prospects for investment in fixed capital in the
LDCs, and demonstrates that the possibility of
improved market access inducing investment in
supply capacity might not become a reality
because many other conditions on which the
willingness to invest hinges are not conducive to
its realisation.52
A3.4 Concluding remarks
The possible improvements in market access
for LDCs in the QUAD that we have evaluated in
this report hold out the promise of higher prices
for their exports to these markets. As we have
shown, this will lead to income gains for them.
These consequences would certainly be
welcomed in some of the world’s poorest
countries. However, it is clear that making the
most of improved market access requires an
expansion of export production. 
Today, LDC economies are actually more open
than those of low-income countries; trade
constitutes a higher share of GDP in LDCs
compared to low-income countries. However,
this is not due to strong export performance. In
this respect, LDCs do not do as well as the
average low-income country, despite currently
having better market access than the latter.53
Of course the explanations for the relatively
weak export sectors of LDCs are manifold. An
important issue not analysed here is the lack of
export infrastructure in the form of institutions
that can ensure that the sanitary and
phytosanitary standards of the importing
countries are satisfied, control the quality of
exports more generally and provide exporters
with information about market conditions
(including requirements for eligibility for
preferential treatment). However, in this
appendix we have shown that low productive
capacity must be suspected of being a major
culprit. Productivity is low in LDCs, particularly
with respect to labour. This is due to low levels
of both physical and human capital. Rates of
investment hold out the prospect of a
reasonably rapid expansion of capacity in the
coming years. However, the foundation on
which accumulation is currently based is weak.
We have seen that LDCs are not attractive
targets for foreign investors at present.
Moreover, their average rate of saving is
negative. This means that foreigners are
financing today’s investment. In fact, the source
of funds is almost exclusively foreign
governments. However, aid flows are dwindling.
Furthermore, debt levels are high, and the
extent to which debt relief will be provided is
unclear. Thus, it is uncertain whether the
investment levels in Table A3.5 can be sustained
without substantial increases in both private and
public savings rates. The latter is particularly
important due to the fact that governments are
major providers of education and health. In
these sectors LDCs have a mountain to climb,
and their governments must start making much
greater contributions to that expedition. They
also need more funds to finance infrastructure
investments if export supply capacities in their
countries are to increase to reach the potential
for exports which tariff-free, quota-free trade
with the QUAD would create. Thus, fiscal
reforms emerge as a key issue in capacity
building. Reforming other economic policies
would also help. Whether such reforms will
materialise is hard to predict. However, even if
they do it seems unlikely that LDC production
for exports will increase substantially in the
short to medium term. The burden of the past
as manifested in low levels of labour
productivity, inadequate infrastructure for
transport and communication, and high levels of
fertility is not shed overnight; nor is a Rome of
economic and political stability built in a day.
52) Examples of important issues which space constraints prevent us from discussing are the degree to which the rule of law is
respected, corruption is a major problem and the bureaucracy is competent. A growing body of empirical research supports the
conclusion of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a,b) that “governance matters”. A brief examination of their data reveals
that for every one of their six governance indicators the median LDC attains significantly lower grades than the sample median. 
53) Moreover, cursory inspection of the few figures that could be obtained leads us to conclude that the level of export taxation is
probably not very different in LDCs compared to other low-income countries.
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STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON
THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(LDCs) OF THE ELIMINATION OF IMPORT
TARIFFS ON THEIR PRODUCTS
A4.1 Background
Developing countries can gain market access
through general tariff reductions made binding
in the World Trade Organization (WTO),
supplemented with tariff reductions and tariff-
free treatment granted through Generalized
System of Preference (GSP) schemes for
imports from developing countries. GSP
schemes are based on targets and guidelines
agreed upon by the industrialised countries and
the developing countries in UNCTAD in 1970.
Their purpose is to stimulate imports from
developing countries, particularly from the
Least Developed Countries (LDCs), by granting
them preferential treatment. It is up to each
importing country to decide how to formulate
its own national GSP scheme, and reciprocity is
not required of the developing countries. Trade
preferences under GSP schemes are based on
Part IV of the GATT, but the trade preferences
thus granted are not bound in the WTO.
Norway implemented a GSP scheme in 1971.
The current scheme provides duty-free access
for all products imported from LDCs with the
exception of grain, meal and feed concentrates.
A ceiling was also placed on the amount of beef
that may be imported duty-free from LDCs each
year under the GSP for 1998–2001.
The LDCs’ share of world trade is still less than
0.5 per cent. According to the WTO (document
WT/COMTD/LDC/W/11/Rev. 1 of 14 December
1998), 60 per cent of LDC exports go to the EU,
Japan and the USA, and 34 per cent go to
emerging markets in Latin America, East and
Southeast Asia and southern Africa.
The study’s point of departure consists of a
number of proposals to grant duty-free access to
products imported from the least developed
countries:
• duty-free and quota-free access for all
products from LDCs, bound in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Cf. proposal by
the WTO General Director which he put
forward in a speech (appended) to the
Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting in
Marrakech on 14 September 1999;
• duty-free and quota-free access for all
products imported from LDCs except arms.
Cf. EU Commission proposal of September
2000, presented in document IP/00/1034
dated 20 September (appended);
• duty-free access for “essentially all
products” imported from LDCs. Cf. EU
proposal in preparation for the Ministerial
Conference in Seattle in 1999, presented in
WTO document WT/GC/W/195 of 2 June
1999 (appended).
These proposals are expected to be the focus of
considerable international attention during the
preparations for the Third United Nations
Conference on the Least Developed Countries
which will be held in May 2001.
A4.2 Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the
economic impacts for the Least Developed
Countries of various types of proposals for duty-
free import of products from these countries.
The effects of duty-free treatment on imports
from LDCs to industrialised countries should be
examined, as well as the effects of duty-free
treatment on imports from LDCs to
industrialised and advanced developing
countries. The study should assess the major
implications of duty-free access on the
economies of LDCs in general, on individual
sectors of special interest and on income
distribution. The effects should be quantified
Appendix 4 The mandate
82
where doing so is feasible and technically
justifiable.
A4.3 Scope of the study
The study should cover, but not necessarily be
limited to, the following topics:
1. Current tariff regimes for LDCs, including
GSP schemes (the defined base line)
2. The possible effects of the following tariff
regime alternatives:
2.1 Duty-free access for all products imported
from LDCs
2.2 Duty-free access for “essentially all
products” imported from LDCs
The following considerations should also be
discussed and evaluated in this context:
3. Product range issues (product coverage,
with variations on “essentially all products”)
4. Binding (including types and degrees of
binding) of zero-rate tariffs in the WTO
5. Various safeguard mechanisms in the
importing countries (such as the possibility
of reinstating ordinary GSP tariff rates if
import volumes of a given product reach a
given percentage of the importing country’s
domestic market)
6. Graduation provisions to go into effect in
response to a decision that a country no
longer has LDC status
7. Rules of origin. It should be assumed for the
time being that the importing countries
continue to apply their present rules of
origin.
Under alternatives 2.1 and 2.2, it should be
assumed that other relevant WTO factors, such
as MFN (Most Favoured Nation) tariffs, are left
unchanged. However, the report may discuss
any significant effects of changes in these tariff
schedules if they are deemed relevant.
The study should discuss major implications for
the LDCs. One possible additional study should
examine the most important repercussions in
other developing countries and in industrialised
countries, with the countries in question
appropriately grouped. Repercussions in
Norway should be assessed separately. Any
additional study must not be put out to tender
unless funding is made available.
A4.4 Method
The study is expected to include:
• Literature studies (general literature on
issues relating to duty-free imports from
LDCs, safeguards and rules of origin;
reports, studies and evaluations of zero-rate
tarif fs, available policy documents,
particularly from the WTO and the EU, etc.)
• Statistics
• Interviews and other types of contact with
persons with relevant knowledge on zero-
rate tarif fs and their impact on LDCs (in
Norwegian government ministries, the
WTO, the ITC (International Trade
Centre), UNCTAD, the World Bank, the
OECD, the EU Commission, LDCs and
delegations from other countries in Geneva,
export promotion organizations for LDCs,
importers, etc.)
A4.5 Study Group
The study should be carried out by a group or a
team of two experts – one Norwegian and one
foreign researcher would do – with expertise in
the following areas:
• International trade policy
• Social and development economics
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• Norwegian and international development
policy
Both members of the team must be fluent in
English, and one of them should be fluent in
Norwegian.
A4.6 Time Frame and Reporting
Work on the study should start in December
2000, and a draft is to be submitted by 8 March
2001. The study group will hold a half-day
seminar in the second week of March (week 11)
to present the results of the study and discuss
them with representatives of relevant
Norwegian institutions. The final report is to be
submitted by 2 April. This report will contain all
significant findings and conclusions. The report
is to be written in English. The study group will
be responsible for the validity of the data
presented, for the analyses conducted and for
the quality of the report.
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Norwegian Permanent Mission Geneva
World Trade Organisation Secretariat Working Group on the Geneva
Integrated Framework and LDCs Issues
Technical Barriers to Trade Geneva
Safeguards Geneva
Rules of Origin Geneva
UNCTAD Geneva
Mission of Canada Geneva
US Mission to the WTO Geneva
Permanent Mission of Japan Geneva
Permanent Mission of Bangladesh Geneva
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Nepal Geneva
Zambian Mission Geneva
European Commission DG Trade Brussels
DG Agriculture Brussels
DG External Relations Brussels
DG Development Brussels




M. Abdul Mannan Minister (Economic) Permanent Mission of
Bangladesh, 
Geneva
Dr. Shambhu Ram Simkhada Ambassador Permanent Mission of the
Kingdom of Nepal, Geneva 
Suresh Man Shrestha Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of the
Kingdom of Nepal, Geneva
B. M. Bowa Ambassador Zambian Mission, Geneva
Edward Chisanga First Secretary (Trade) Zambian Mission, Geneva
Elin Østebø Johansen Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission of
Norway, Geneva
Adair Heuchan Counsellor Mission of Canada, Geneva
Alicia D. Greenidge Assistant Deputy Chief of Mission US Mission to the WTO,
and Senior Counsellor Geneva
Toshio Onishi First Secretary Permanent Mission of Japan,
Geneva
Vivien Liu Counsellor WTO, Technical Barriers to
Trade
Susan Hainsworth Counsellor WTO, Safeguards
Eki Kim Counsellor WTO, Rules of Origin
Chiedu Osakwe Special Coordinator for LDCs WTO, Secretariat Working
Group on the Integrated
Framework and LDCs Issues
Sajal Mathur Economic Affairs Officer WTO, Secretariat Working
Group on the Integrated
Framework and LDCs Issues
John D. A. Cuddy Director DITC and Executive UNCTAD
Secretary, LDC-III Conference
Jean-Nicolas Marchal Deputy Executive Secretary, UNCTAD
LDC-III Conference
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Stefano Inama Project Manager, DITC UNCTAD
Luca Monge Roffarello Associate Economic UNCTAD
Affairs Officer, DITC
Emily Mburu Consultant UNCTAD
Remco Vahl Administrator, Trade Policy European Commission, DG
Trade
Claude Maerten Assistant Deputy Director-General European Commission, DG
Development
John Richards Deputy Head of Unit, Textiles European Commission, DG
External Relations
Marina Mastrostefano European Commission, DG
Agriculture
Michael Kattenbelt Senior Administrative Assistant European Commission, DG
Agriculture
Leo Maier European Commission, DG
Agriculture
Gustavo Martin Prada Head of Unit, Trade Analysis European Commission, DG
Trade
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